The Supreme Court’s conference on Wednesday included three civil case straight grants, 57 disposals of grant-and-holds, and more. Over the last six conferences, the court has straight granted in seven civil cases and no criminal cases. There hasn’t been a criminal case straight grant since July 30.
In the broken-record department (does anyone under 40 even get that reference?): It was yet another short-handed conference, with just six justices participating, because Governor Newsom has left unfilled a nearly-11–month-long vacancy on the court.
Clemency approved
Another LWOP commutation is greenlighted.
Review granted: off-campus sexual assault
The court agreed to hear Victor Valley Union High School District v. Superior Court to resolve a conflict — partially intra-district — in Court of Appeal opinions about an exception to a statute that otherwise absolves school districts of responsibility for the “safety of any pupil . . . at any time when such pupil is not on school property.” The case involves a high school teacher’s sexual abuse of a student at the teacher’s home and the school district’s alleged negligence in supervising its staff.
The exception in the statute — Education Code section 44808 — allows for liability when a school district “has undertaken to provide transportation for such pupil to and from the school premises, has undertaken a school-sponsored activity off the premises of such school, has otherwise specifically assumed such responsibility or liability or has failed to exercise reasonable care under the circumstances.”
The issue as summarized by court staff (see here) is: “Under Education Code section 44808, can a school district be held liable for injuries to a student that occurred off school property based solely on the fact that the injuries were proximately caused by the school district’s negligent act that occurred on school property?”
Refusing to order summary judgment for the defendant school district, the Fourth District, Division Two, Court of Appeal’s published opinion held the immunity inapplicable. It concluded that, under the Supreme Court’s Hoyem v. Manhattan Beach City School District (1978) 22 Cal.3d 508 decision, “the application of section 44808 depends upon the location of the alleged negligent act—not the location of the injury.” Division Two found dispositive “evidence that a teacher openly escorted a student through campus, past another employee, into a parking lot, into his personal vehicle, and transported her off campus, without any measures in place to prevent such conduct.”
Division Two declined to follow two of its own decisions — Mosley v. San Bernardino City Unified School District (2005) 134 Cal.App.4th 1260 and LeRoy v. Yarboi (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 737 — and also the First District, Division Four, opinion in Vallejo City Unified School District v. Superior Court (2025) 118 Cal.App.5th 139.
A concurring opinion said that “[s]ection 44808 eliminates a district’s vicarious liability for an employee’s off-campus conduct, even when performed within the scope of employment,” but preserves liability “for the district’s own negligence.”
The Supreme Court denied review and a depublication request in Mosley and denied review in Vallejo City. There was no petition for review in LeRoy.
Horvitz & Levy is appellate counsel for the School District and filed the petition for review.
Review granted: FCRA standing
The court also granted review in Askins v. CRST Expedited, Inc. The issue as summarized by court staff (see here) is: “Is an allegation that defendant violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA; 15 U.S.C. § 1681 et seq.) sufficient to allege an injury and bring an FCRA claim in California courts?” The plaintiff is seeking to bring a class action based on allegations that, when he applied for a job, his employer conducted background checks without required disclosure and authorization forms.
As in Victor Valley (above), the court will be resolving a conflict in the case law. The First District, Division Three, in a published opinion, held a plaintiff need not allege a concrete injury for FCRA standing in California courts, concluding “Congress authorized recovery of statutory damages for failure to comply with the FCRA for a statutory violation, even absent proof of harm.” It disagreed with the Fifth District’s decision in Limon v. Circle K Stores Inc. (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 671.
The Supreme Court denied review and two depublication requests in Limon.
Review granted: Government Claims Act
The court will hear Harland v. City of West Hollywood, in which court staff summarized the issue (see here) to be: “If a plaintiff prematurely files a lawsuit against a public entity while a Government Claims Act (Gov. Code, § 810 et seq.) claim remains pending, and subsequently voluntarily dismisses the lawsuit without prejudice, is the plaintiff barred from filing a second lawsuit based on the same claim?”
In a published opinion, the Second District, Division Eight, affirmed the dismissal on demurrer of the plaintiff’s personal injury action. The appellate court reasoned that “[t]he claims presentation requirements ensures [sic] public entities get sufficient information to investigate claims without the expense of litigation” and that the plaintiff “deprived the [defendant] City of the opportunity to investigate her claim before forcing it into litigation with her.”
Grant-and-transfer: retroactive electricity rates
The court granted review in California Community Choice Association v. Public Utilities Commission and sent the case back to the Third District with directions to vacate its summary denial of a petition for writ of review and to issue a writ of review.
Cities and counties can become community choice aggregators to “combine the loads of its residents, businesses, and municipal facilities in a communitywide electricity buyers’ program.” (Pub. Utilities Code section 331.1.)
The petition for review challenges the PUC’s retroactive application of what the petition says is “a new method [adopted by the PUC] for calculating a rate intended to prevent cost shifts between utility customers and [CCA] customers,” one that “re-allocated responsibility for more than one billion dollars of costs from utility customers to CCA customers.”
Grant-and-transfer: probation revocation
The court granted-and-transferred in Gutierrez v. Superior Court, remanding the case to the Fourth District, Division One, with directions to issue an alternative writ after the appellate court had summarily denied the writ petition in the case.
The petition for review says the case involves the superior court’s authority to revoke probation and impose a previously suspended sentence after the defendant has been imprisoned for another offense. Penal Code section 1203.2a provides that court is “deprived of jurisdiction over defendant if it does not issue its commitment . . . within 60 days after being notified of the confinement.”
One of the three issues raised in the petition is: “After that 60-day period expires and the superior court expressly finds that section 1203.2a has deprived it of jurisdiction, may probation restore the court’s authority by filing a new [probation] revocation petition based solely on the identical subsequent offense and prison commitment?”
The answer to the petition and the reply are here and here.
Dissenting vote: Racial Justice Act
The court denied a pro per’s handwritten petition for review in In re Compton, but Justice Evans recorded a dissenting vote. The petitioner sought appointment of counsel to pursue claims under California’s Racial Justice Act (see here, here, and here).
The Second District, Division Seven, summarily denied the pro per’s habeas corpus petition, which it summarized in its denial order as claiming that “people of other races charged with the same offense as him are treated differently than he was, and that he received a longer sentence than others convicted of the same offense.” That order cited the failure to “adequately describe or attach supporting documentary evidence concerning [the petitioner’s] claims such as court transcripts, statistical evidence, aggregate data, or nonstatistical evidence demonstrating similarly situated defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins received more lenient sentences than petitioner.”
The answer to the petition for review and the reply are here and here.
Dissenting vote: manslaughter while high
Justice Evans also dissented from the denial of review in People v. Spejcher. The Second District, Division Six, in an unpublished 2-1 opinion, affirmed an involuntary manslaughter conviction for a defendant who, while she was intoxicated from a substantial amount of marijuana, repeatedly stabbed a companion to death. The defendant claimed there was insufficient evidence of her criminal intent.
The majority concluded, “substantial evidence supports a reasonable jury finding appellant voluntarily and willingly consumed more marijuana than she ever had, with someone she had only recently met, without taking any precautions at all, and her negligence in self-intoxicating to the point of unconsciousness was criminal.”
The dissent wanted the case against the defendant to be dismissed. Saying he had “never seen a case even remotely similar to the instant case,” the dissenter asserted the defendant “was, in essence, poisoned” because “[t]here was no reason, whatsoever, for her to believe that two ‘hits’ of marijuana would render her immediately incapacitated and unconscious.”
Dissenting vote: (probably) Perkins operation
Justice Liu was the only member of the court to record a vote to hear People v. Sandoval, in which the Second District, Division Eight, unpublished opinion affirmed a conviction for two murders. The defendant unsuccessfully argued that the superior court erred in admitting statements he made to an undercover agent in jail in what is known as a Perkins operation, that there was prosecutorial misconduct, and that his attorney was ineffective in not objecting to the misconduct.
Because the dissenting vote was unexplained, it’s not certain which issue or issues attracted Justice Liu’s attention (there’s a fairly simple cure for that: When a message vote’s message is muddled), but we’re guessing it was the Perkins issue, which has been on Liu’s radar for some time and, indeed, is pending before the court in People v. Allen (see here and here). However, in Allen, unlike in Sandoval, the defendant invoked his Miranda right to remain silent before being questioned by the undercover agent.
Dissenting votes: youth offender parole denial
Justices Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Olson. The Second District, Division One, in an unpublished opinion, rejected constitutional challenges to a statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed between ages 18 and 25. The defendant was 20 at the time of the murder of her roommate.
Besides the equal protection arguments regularly rejected in past cases, the defendant, after Division One asked for supplemental briefing on the issue, relied on the First District, Division Four, decision in People v. Briscoe (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 479, which held the statute violates equal protection by excluding from possible parole a non-killer defendant sentenced for first degree murder with robbery-murder and burglary-murder special circumstances but allowing for parole those convicted of first degree felony murder based on robbery and burglary.
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. After Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from review denials in youth offender parole denial cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed. (See here and recently here; see also here and, regarding a Briscoe argument, here.)
Dissenting vote: juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing
Justice Evans also recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in People v. Wilson. In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth District, Division One, affirmed the denial of a resentencing petition by the defendant who was sentenced to 40 years to life for a murder committed when he was 17.
The defendant sought relief under Penal Code section 1170, which generally permits resentencing of some defendants who were sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed when they were minors, and under the Division One decision in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, which held that, consistent with equal protection principles, resentencing must also be allowed for those sentenced to the “functional equivalent of life without parole.”
In Wilson, Division One held the defendant’s sentence was not functionally equivalent to LWOP. Quoting the Fifth District’s opinion in People v. Baldwin (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 978, Division One wrote, “ ‘[T]he Legislature could have made a rational choice to target the harshest juvenile punishment first, and the one that guarantees the juvenile will die in prison,’ ” and concluded a “40 years to life [sentence] is not functionally equivalent to LWOP under Heard because it is ‘not a sentence that guarantees death in prison.’ ”
The Supreme Court last year granted review in People v. Munoz to decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here; see also here.)
50 years to life sentences are getting the court’s attention; lesser, but still very lengthy, sentences, not so much. (See here.)
The Supreme Court said the Wilson denial of review is “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after this court decides . . . Munoz.”
Justice Evans — and Justice Liu — have dissented in similar cases. (See recently here.) Justice Evans also dissented from the denial of review in Baldwin. (See here.)
Review denied: Harvey Weinstein conviction
On the same day that a New York state court sentenced Harvey Weinstein to 15 years in prison for a felony sex crime, the California Supreme Court denied his petition for review that sought to overturn a conviction, with a 16-year sentence, for forcible oral copulation, sexual penetration by a foreign object, and forcible rape.
In a 112-page unpublished opinion, the Second District, Division One, rejected many arguments to reverse the convictions, but agreed with the Attorney General in concluding the defendant “is entitled to remand for resentencing because the [superior] court imposed an upper term sentence based on a now-invalid aggravating factor [convictions in New York that have since been vacated].”
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were two criminal case grant-and-holds, one each waiting for decisions in People v. Eaton (see here) and in People v. Meno (see here and here). Meno was argued in September, but the opinion will be delayed because of post-argument supplemental briefing.
Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here)
The court disposed of a whopping 57 grant-and-holds.
The court dismissed review in 15 cases that had been holding for the death penalty opinions in both People v. Hin (2025) 17 Cal.5th 401 (see here) and People v. Bankston (2026) 19 Cal.5th 786 (see here).
Review was also dismissed in one case holding for Hin, Bankston, and People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (see here).
The court dismissed review in one case holding for Hin, Bankston, and People v. Aguirre (2025) 18 Cal.5th 629 (see here).
Sixteen cases were transferred back to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of People v. Mitchell (2026) 19 Cal.5th 729 (see here).
The court dismissed review in 24 cases that were holding for People v. Espino (2026) 20 Cal.5th 57 (see here). Many of those cases had originally been grant-and-holds for People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050 (see here), but were converted to Espino grant-and-holds after the Rhodius decision and after Espino, which itself had been a Rhodius grant-and-hold, was un-held. (See here.)
