At its conference yesterday, a double one with just six justices participating, the court ruled on a whopping 177 matters. There was one straight grant, but dissents from seven review denials. Also, the court greenlighted three sentence commutations.
Review granted: brandishing a firearm
The court agreed to hear People v. Ball. A belatedly published opinion by the Fourth District, Division Three, Court of Appeal reversed an order dismissing a felony charge under Penal Code section 417.3 of exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner in the presence of a vehicle occupant.
Division Three held that, because section 417.3 says the exhibiting must be “in such a way as to cause a reasonable person apprehension or fear of bodily harm,” the superior court erred in relying on a lack of evidence that the victim suffered any subjective fear. “[T]he Legislature did not intend to require that the brandishing victim experience subjective fear,” the appellate court concluded. It also found that seemingly contrary statements in two other opinions were dicta.
[December 12 update: Here is the issue as summarized by court staff (see here) — “Does drawing or exhibiting a firearm in a threatening manner in the presence of a motor vehicle occupant (Pen. Code, § 417.3) require proof of both objective and subjective fear, or is proof of objective fear alone sufficient?”]
Clemency recommendations
The court granted Governor Gavin Newsom’s October requests (see here) for the constitutionally required recommendations that allows him to commute the long sentences of Ralph Arreguin, Baleegh Brown, and Jessie Milo.
The Governor’s requests stated:
For Arreguin — “In 2008, Mr. Arreguin was convicted of robbery with a sentence enhancement. He was sentenced to a prison term of 35 years to life. Mr. Arreguin has prior felony convictions for receiving stolen property (1986), robbery (1987, 1992), attempted robbery (1987), and drug possession (1998).”
For Brown — “In 2012, Mr. Brown was convicted of assault with a semiautomatic firearm and robbery with sentence enhancements. He was sentenced to a prison term of 34 years. Mr. Brown has prior felony convictions for robbery (2007) and burglary (2009).”
For Milo — “In 2004, Mr. Milo was convicted of three counts of attempted murder with sentence enhancements. He was sentenced to a prison term of 170 years to life. Mr. Milo has prior felony convictions for burglary (1998) and evading a peace officer (2001).”
The court’s recommendations noted that the requests stated Newsom is contemplating the commutations will make all three eligible for earlier parole suitability hearings. (Related: “Newsom grants clemency, but freedom isn’t certain”.)
Newsom has a nearly perfect clemency record: he withdrew one request before a ruling, but the court — applying a deferential standard (see here and here) — has approved all 90 of his other requests. (Not counting two requests that are still pending.) That’s better than former Governor Jerry Brown, who had the court without explanation block 10 intended clemency grants. The denial of a request implies that a clemency grant would be an abuse of power.
Another headless PAGA grant-and-hold
Domingo v. Prime Healthcare Paradise Valley is another grant-and-hold for Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (see here), in which the court limited the issues to: “1.) Does every Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (PAGA) action necessarily include both individual and non-individual PAGA claims, regardless of whether the complaint specifically alleges individual claims? 2.) Can a plaintiff choose to bring only a non-individual PAGA action?”
In Domingo, the Fourth District, Division One, in an unpublished opinion, followed its decision in Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services LTD., LLC (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 69 (which is also a Leeper grant-and-hold (see here)) and affirmed the denial of the defendant employer’s motion to compel arbitration of a labor code violations lawsuit, holding the plaintiff was allowed to sue in a non-individual capacity only and was not required to assert any individual claims.
Because the underlying lawsuit in Leeper has been dismissed at the plaintiff’s request, we guessed the Supreme Court would dismiss review in Leeper and straight grant in another case raising the same issues. That hasn’t happened. In fact, party briefing is complete in Leeper. Besides Rodriguez, other Leeper grant-and-holds are Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC (see here), Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (see here), CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (see here), Medina v. Sood Enterprises, Inc. (see here), Neubecker v. Evans Hotels (see here), and Resendiz v. Canyon Restaurant (see here).
Racial Justice Act rulings
As has become routine, the court ruled on a number of petitions alleging violations of California’s Racial Justice Act (here, here, and here).
The court issued orders to show cause, returnable in the superior court, in two pro pers’ habeas corpus petitions, In re Ramsey and In re Romero. One alleges systemic racism, the other case-specific bias.
Cause is to be shown in both why the petitioners are “not entitled to appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e).” In Ramsey, the OSC is “in light of statistical data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of Three Strikes sentences in Los Angeles County.” In Romero, it’s “in light of petitioner’s claim that during deliberations a juror exhibited bias or animus towards petitioner because of petitioner’s race, ethnicity, or national origin, and used racially discriminatory language about petitioner’s race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
The court has made many orders like this before. (See here and, recently, here.)
The court also denied some pro per RJA habeas petitions and discovery requests, including In re Davis, In re Marquez, In re Phillips, In re Roberts, and In re Torres. The court said petitioners had “ ‘not established a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under the Racial Justice Act.’ ” But the court said the denials were “without prejudice to any relief to which petitioner might be entitled after this court decides [In re] Montgomery,” in which the court has granted review to decide, “Must a petitioner allege a prima facie case for relief under the Racial Justice Act (Pen. Code, § 745; RJA) before the trial court can consider a discovery request for disclosure of evidence under the RJA (id., subd. (d))?” More about Montgomery here and here.
Dissenting votes: juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing and youth offender parole
The court denied review in People v. Barajas, People v. Cortez, People v. Urquilla, and People v. Barrett, but Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans recorded votes to grant in Barajas and Urquilla, Justice Evans dissented in Cortez, and Justice Liu dissented in Barrett.
In Barajas, a Fifth District unpublished opinion affirmed a resentencing denial for a defendant serving 40 years to life for an attempted murder committed when he was 17 and also 50 years to life for first degree murder committed when he was 18. The appellate court rejected separate equal protection challenges to each sentence. Justices Liu and Evans have frequently dissented from the denials of review in both juvenile offender (see recently here) and youthful offender (see here and recently here; see also here) sentencing cases.
Cortez and Urquilla are only youthful offender cases.
The Sixth District’s belatedly published Cortez opinion held it was not cruel or unusual under the California Constitution to sentence the defendant to life without the possibility of parole for a murder committed when he was 25. The Sixth District decided other issues, too, including the sufficiency of the evidence that the murder was committed for the benefit of a criminal street gang, and Justice Evans’s recorded vote is not explained, so it’s not certain that the LWOP sentence was what got her attention. (There’s a fairly simple cure for that: When a message vote’s message is muddled.)
In Urquilla, the Second District, Division Five, in an unpublished opinion, rejected equal protection and cruel-or-unusual attacks on a LWOP sentence for two murders committed when he was 20.
Barrett involved only the denial of resentencing for a juvenile offender. The defendant was sentenced to 26 years to life for a first degree murder committed when he was 16. The First District, Division Two, in an unpublished opinion, upheld the denial of the defendant’s resentencing petition.
The review denials in Barajas and Barrett were expressly “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after th[e] [Supreme] court decides People v. Munoz.” The court granted review in Munoz to decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here; see also here.) 50 years to life sentences for juvenile offenders are getting the court’s attention; lesser, but still very lengthy, sentences for those offenders, not so much. (See here.)
Dissenting votes: murder resentencing
Justice Liu also recorded dissenting votes from the denials of review in People v. Mott and People v. May. Justice Evans joined him in the Mott case. Both cases concern the denials of resentencing under Penal Code section 1172.6, part of Senate Bill 1437, 2018 legislation that eliminated murder liability under the natural and probable consequences doctrine, significantly limited the scope of the felony murder rule, and allowed for resentencing for some convictions obtained under prior law. The Court of Appeal opinions in both cases followed remands from the Supreme Court. The defendants in both cases were convicted of murders committed when they were 19.
In Mott, a Third District unpublished opinion affirmed the denial of resentencing for the defendant sentenced to life without parole for a murder committed during an attempted robbery. It followed a remand from the Supreme Court for reconsideration in light of People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 (see here and here). The defendant claimed there was insufficient evidence that she was a major participant in the attempted robbery and acted with reckless indifference to human life.
An unpublished opinion by the Fourth District, Division Two, in May affirmed the denial of resentencing for a defendant sentenced to life without parole for a first degree murder committed during a robbery. The Supreme Court granted review of the first May opinion and sent the case back for reconsideration in light of both People v. Strong (2022) 13 Cal.5th 698 (see here) and People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (see here). (After the remand, Division Two issued another decision returning the case to the superior court for reconsideration there.) The appellate court found unavailing the defendant’s assertion that there was not substantial evidence to support the finding that he acted with reckless indifference to human life.
Division Two’s latest opinion notes that Governor Newsom commuted the defendant’s sentence and that the Board of Parole Hearings recommended the defendant for parole, but it opted to review the resentencing denial “despite defendant having been granted clemency and likely released from prison.”
Dissenting vote: Fourth Amendment
Justice Evans also recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in Sandoval v. Superior Court. The Fifth District’s unpublished opinion upheld a superior court ruling denying a motion to dismiss firearms and marijuana-possession-for-sale charges. The motion was filed after the superior court denied a motion to suppress evidence obtained during a search of a car in which the defendant was a passenger. According to the opinion, the search came after an officer, having made a traffic stop for illegally tinted windows, “smelled an ‘overwhelming odor of marijuana,’ which led him to believe that the amount of marijuana in the vehicle was over the legal limit.”
The Fifth District ruled there was reasonable suspicion to stop the car, the officer had probable cause to search the car, and the defendant was not denied an effective cross-examination of the officer.
Review denied: homophobic police officer
The court denied review in Sangervasi v. City of San José.
A police officer objected when the City’s police chief authorized officers to place Rainbow Pride patches on their uniforms. As reported in the Sixth District’s unpublished opinion, the officer sent a memo to the Chief saying the “patch was a ‘disgusting desecration and perversion’ of the traditional police uniform,” asserting that the action “demonstrated that the Chief was ‘unfit for command’ and ‘an enemy’ of the United States,” and “propos[ing], if alternatives were allowed, several patches of his own, including one containing a dual lightning bolt symbol associated with the Nazi Shutzstaffel (SS).”
After the officer was fired, he sued in pro per, claiming the memo was protected by both the First Amendment and the oath he swore under article VI of the U.S. Constitution. The superior court denied his petition for administrative mandamus and the Sixth District affirmed.
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were three criminal case grant-and-holds: one more waiting for a decision in People v. Allen (see here and here) and two more holding for People v. Eaton (see here).
Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here)
The court removed from the docket two more cases that were waiting for the June felony murder resentencing opinion in People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 (see here and here) and 12 that were on hold for the August Three Strikes sentencing opinion in People v. Fletcher (2025) 18 Cal.5th 576 (see here).
Review was dismissed in the two Emanuel grant-and-holds. Ten of the Fletcher grant-and-holds were sent back to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Fletcher; the court dismissed review in the other two.
