The Supreme Court didn’t straight grant any cases at its conference yesterday, the fifth of the last six conferences without a matter put on track for briefing, oral argument, and opinion. But there were significant actions.
Review denied: ban on hiring undocumented UC students
A pattern in juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing grant-and-holds
There were grant-and-hold orders in three cases — including one grant on the court’s own motion — raising issues related to People v. Munoz, in which the court agreed to decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here.)
All three involve juvenile-offender sentences of 50 years (or more) to life. (People v. Ransom (opinion here), People v. Medrano (51 years to life) (opinion here), People v. Peredia (opinion here).) In earlier cases with sentences of 40 years (or fewer) to life, however, the court has denied review “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after this court decides . . . Munoz”; Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans have dissented from those denials. (See recently here, here, here, and here.)
Ransom was the own-motion grant: the Fourth District, Division Two, Court of Appeal held the defendant eligible for recall and resentencing, the Attorney General — representing the People — did not seek review, and the San Bernardino District Attorney’s office requested a grant of review on the court’s own motion. It was the defendant’s petition for review in Medrano. The San Bernardino DA represented the People in Peredia and petitioned for review.
Here’s a reading of the tea leaves by me, with no criminal law expertise: the court might or might not find a 50 years to life sentence entitles a juvenile-offender defendant to recall and resentencing, but, because the court’s policy seemingly is to grant-and-hold in matters where relief might come from an opinion in a pending lead case (see here), juvenile offenders with less than 50 years to life sentences likely will not be entitled to any relief from the future Munoz opinion.
Opportunity to brief new issue: Racial Justice Act
The court granted review in In re (Carlos) Huerta and In re (Diego) Huerta and returned the cases to the Fifth District with directions in each “to vacate its decision and reconsider the cause after affording the parties an opportunity to brief the issue of whether a gang enhancement constitutes an ‘offense’ within the meaning of Penal Code section 745, subdivision (a)(3) or (a)(4)(A) in light of Government Code section 68081.”
Section 745 is the foundational statute of California’s Racial Justice Act. (Here and here.) Section 68081 requires an appellate court to grant a rehearing petition if the court bases its decision “upon an issue which was not proposed or briefed by any party” and it hasn’t given “the parties an opportunity to present their views on the matter through supplemental briefing.”
In a published opinion (which is depublished by the Supreme Court’s order to vacate the decision) in Carlos Huerta’s case and an unpublished opinion in Diego Huerta’s case, the Fifth District held the defendants had not made a prima facie showing of an entitlement to counsel to litigate allegations of an RJA violation. They had been convicted of several serious felonies with the juries also finding true gang enhancements, and their racial discrimination claims were based on statistics that Hispanic defendants in Tulare County are disproportionately subjected to gang enhancements and longer sentences compared to similarly situated individuals of other races. The appellate court concluded the RJA applies only to “offenses” (like the felonies of which the defendants were convicted), not “the charging and sentencing of gang enhancements, which do not fall within the scope of the relevant statutory provisions.”
Racial Justice Act OSC and grant-and-transfer
In In re Thomas, a pro per’s habeas corpus petition filed more than 14 months ago, the court issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, “why petitioner is not entitled to appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges facts constituting a violation of the Racial Justice Act] [see here and here], in light of statistical data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in incarceration and arrest rates under the Three Strikes law in Ventura County.”
After the Second District, Division Four, summarily denied a habeas corpus petition, the Supreme Court granted review in In re Sandoval and directed Division Four to issue an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, “why petitioner is not entitled to relief based on his claim that the prosecutor’s reference to petitioner as a ‘thug’ during the trial violated the Racial Justice Act. (See Pen. Code, § 745, subds. (a)(2), (h)(4).)”
The court has made orders like these before. (See recently here.)
Depublication: implied malice voluntary manslaughter
The court denied review in People v. Fleming, but it depublished the opinion of the Second District, Division Six.
The defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter based on a conscious disregard for human life. Division Six affirmed, but the Supreme Court made the case a grant-and-hold and later directed the appellate court to reconsider in light of People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (see here), People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416 (see here), and People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (see here). On remand, Division Six again affirmed the conviction, finding that “Reyes’s holding requiring a ‘high degree of probability’ of death applies only to implied malice murder” and that “[t]he concept of malice has nothing to do with voluntary manslaughter.” However, it also required resentencing under Salazar and Lynch.
Another 998 costs grant-and-hold
Maqueda v. Kia Motors America is a second grant-and-hold for Gorobets v. Jaguar Land Rover North America (see here), which is expected to decide, “Is a settlement offer under Code of Civil Procedure section 998 that contains two options inherently invalid, presumptively invalid, or invalid or partially or entirely valid depending on a separate and independent evaluation of each option?”
In Maqueda, the Fourth District, Division One, in a short unpublished opinion, followed its opinion in the other Gorobets grant-and-hold, Zavala v. Hyundai Motor America (see here), concluding that “section 998 offers may include simultaneous, independent options for the offeree to select from.” It reversed an award to the plaintiffs of over $200,000 in attorney fees, costs, and expenses.
Another headless PAGA grant-and-hold
Medina v. Sood Enterprises, Inc. is another grant-and-hold for Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (see here), in which the court limited the issues to: “1.) Does every Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (PAGA) action necessarily include both individual and non-individual PAGA claims, regardless of whether the complaint specifically alleges individual claims? 2.) Can a plaintiff choose to bring only a non-individual PAGA action?”
In an unpublished opinion, the Second District, Division Seven, held “[u]nambiguous [s]tatutory [l]anguage” bars a plaintiff from bringing only a non-individual PAGA action. It thus required the plaintiff to either reinstate his individual claim — which then might be subject to arbitration — or to have his representative action dismissed.
Because the underlying lawsuit in Leeper has been dismissed at the plaintiff’s request, we guessed the Supreme Court would dismiss review in Leeper and straight grant in another case raising the same issues. That hasn’t happened. In fact, the parties are at the tail end of briefing in Leeper, the reply brief now due December 8. Other Leeper grant-and-holds are Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC (see here), Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC (see here), Osuna v. Spectrum Security Services, Inc. (see here), and CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (see here).
Another forum selection grant-and-hold
Severo v. Forest River is another grant-and-hold for Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach (see here), in which the parties were directed to brief these issues: “(1) Where a party alleges that enforcement of a forum selection clause would result in a waiver of the party’s unwaivable statutory rights, what is the showing necessary to enforce (or avoid enforcement) of such a clause, and which party bears the burden of proof on the issue? (2) Under what circumstances, if any, does a stipulation to apply California law in the selected forum rebut an allegation that enforcement of a forum selection clause would result in a waiver of a party’s unwaivable statutory rights? (3) If enforcement of a choice of law clause would result in a waiver of a party’s unwaivable statutory rights, is the choice of law clause severable from the remainder of the agreement?”
Horvitz & Levy is appellate counsel for the defendants in Lathrop.
The Severo petition for review was a couple of days late, but the court filed it after granting relief from default. (See: Getting relief for a late petition for review might not be a hopeless cause.) Justice Joshua Groban was recused.
In Severo, a Second District, Division Two, unpublished opinion held a defendant’s stipulation to apply California law in Indiana — the jurisdiction required by a warranty the plaintiff is alleging was breached — was insufficient to save the warranty’s forum selection clause. The court said, “rewriting a contract to conform to California law only after a party has sued does not further the interests of justice; it does not protect those consumers who, unaware of their unwaivable rights, either file suit in Indiana or are dissuaded from filing suit at all because of the forum selection clause, and it does nothing to provide an incentive to the company to modify its warranty to comply with California law.”
Dissenting vote: $80,000,000 water rates overcharge
The court denied review in Patz v. City of San Diego, but Justice Joshua Groban recorded a vote to grant. A 2-1 published opinion by the Fourth District, Division Two, affirmed a judgment awarding a $79,541,880 refund — increasing by $643,750 per month — to a class of San Diego single family residence water customers based on years-long overcharges in violation of Proposition 218, which added article XIII D to the California Constitution. Section 6 of XIII D, the provision at issue, provides, “The amount of a fee or charge imposed upon any parcel or person as an incident of property ownership shall not exceed the proportional cost of the service attributable to the parcel.”
The majority opinion is 116 pages. The dissent, covering 62 pages, said the “appeal presented the opportunity to clarify the law in this area and thereby make it easier for trial courts to dispose of wholly meritless lawsuits like this one. Unfortunately, the majority opinion has not only missed that opportunity but also has achieved the opposite result, making it impossible for California public water utilities to defend tiered rates, and arguably impossible to defend any rates at all.”
Dissenting votes: youth offender parole denial
Justices Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Lima. In an unpublished opinion, the Second District, Division Six, rejected constitutional challenges to a statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26.
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. After Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from review denials in youth offender parole cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed. (See here and recently here; see also here.)
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were four criminal case grant-and-holds this week: besides the three Munoz grant-and-holds (see above), there is one more case waiting for a decision in People v. Eaton (see here).
Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here)
The court dismissed review in one case that was on hold for the probation-reduction decisions in People v. Faial (2025) 18 Cal.5th 199 (see here) and People v. Prudholme (2023) 14 Cal.5th 961 (see here). In seven other cases that were waiting just for the Faial opinion, the court dismissed review in five and sent the other two back to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Faial. In one of the cases, review was granted and the matter held over three years ago.
