Wednesday’s no-straight-grant conference had enough notable actions that we’re reporting about it in two parts. Part I is here.
Dissenting votes: juvenile restitution several liability
Justices Goodwin Liu and Leondra Kruger recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in In re J.D. In a 2-1 unpublished opinion, the Sixth District Court of Appeal interpreted a year-old statutory amendment (Welf. & Inst. Code, section 730.6(b)(3); Assembly Bill 1186, Stats. 2024, ch. 805) providing that, for victim restitution, “each minor shall be held severally liable, and shall not be held jointly and severally liable as co-offenders. The court shall apportion liability based on each minor’s percentage of responsibility or fault for all economic losses included in the order of restitution.”
Analogizing to several-liability law in civil cases (Civ. Code, section 1431.2), J.D. argued that, because five of her friends joined her in beating the victim, she should not bear 100 percent liability for restitution. But the Sixth District majority held that, “because the California Constitution expressly provides that crime victims—unlike tort victims—are entitled to reimbursement for their losses,” and “[b]ecause no other co-offenders were adjudicated in this case, J.D. is responsible for the full amount of victim restitution.”
The dissent said the state Constitution doesn’t apply to victim restitution in juvenile cases, because, the constitutional right-to-restitution provision “applies to persons ‘convicted of . . . crimes,’ . . . [i]n juvenile adjudications, minors are not convicted of crimes; instead, as the Welfare and Institutions Code expressly states, in juvenile adjudications minors are adjudged wards of the court.” Thus, the dissent argued, “Section 730.6’s new restitution provision should be interpreted to follow the general understanding of several liability and require consideration of the responsibility of all identifiable wrongdoers.”
Question: if, as the dissent said, the “appeal appears to be the first to consider how to calculate several liability under [amended section 730.6],” why isn’t the Sixth District opinion published? Rule 8.1105(c) provides, “An opinion of a Court of Appeal . . . should be certified for publication . . . if the opinion . . . [e]stablishes a new rule of law; . . . [a]dvances a new interpretation, clarification, criticism, or construction of a provision of a constitution, statute, ordinance, or court rule;” or [i]s accompanied by a separate opinion concurring or dissenting on a legal issue, and publication of the majority and separate opinions would make a significant contribution to the development of the law.” (Emphasis added.)
Dissenting vote: SVPA commitment
The court denied review in People v. German, but Justice Liu recorded a dissenting vote. The Fourth District, Division One, unpublished opinion affirmed an order civilly committing the defendant under the Sexually Violent Predators Act.
The defendant claimed that his diagnosed Antisocial Personality Disorder was not, as required for commitment, a mental disorder making it likely a person will engage in future acts of sexually violent criminal behavior if released from custody. Division One noted the defendant “emphasize[d] that there is some difference of opinion among professional evaluators as to whether, or under what circumstances, someone with ASPD can qualify as an SVP.” The appellate court concluded, however, “Certainly, there are many cases in which an individual is diagnosed with ASPD but is not predisposed to committing sexually violent offenses, or is not likely to commit such offenses in the future. But here, the jury was provided with ample evidence from which it could reasonably conclude that German’s ASPD did predispose him, and that there was such likelihood.”
Dissenting votes: youth offender parole denial
Justice Kelli Evans recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in People v. Laws. In an unpublished opinion, the Second District, Division Four, rejected constitutional challenges to a statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26.
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. After Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from review denials in youth offender parole denial cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed. (See here and recently here; see also here.) For an unknown reason, Justice Liu didn’t record a dissent from the denial of review in Laws.
Dissenting vote: juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing
The court denied review in People v. Tamayo, but Justices Liu and Evans recorded votes to grant. In an unpublished opinion, the Second District, Division One, affirmed the denial of a resentencing petition by a defendant serving 46 years to life for first degree murder, attempted murder, and mayhem, committed when he was 16.
The defendant sought relief under Penal Code section 1170, which generally permits resentencing of some defendants who were sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed when they were minors, and under the Fourth District, Division One, decision in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, which held that, consistent with equal protection principles, resentencing must also be allowed for those sentenced to the “functional equivalent of life without parole.” The Second District concluded that Tamayo’s sentence “does not ‘guarantee[ ] death in prison.’ ”
The Supreme Court last year granted review in People v. Munoz to decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here; see also here.)
50 years to life sentences are getting the court’s attention; lesser, but still very lengthy, sentences, not so much. (See here.)
The Tamayo denial of review is “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after this court decides . . . Munoz.” Justices Liu and Evans have dissented in similar cases. (See recently here.)
Dissenting vote: murder conviction affirmance
Justice Liu also recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in People v. Sibilio. A First District, Division Four, unpublished opinion affirmed a second degree murder conviction, rejecting the defendant’s arguments that reversal was necessary “because of the trial court’s insufficient response to a jury question about implied malice, a lack of substantial evidence that he murdered [the victim, his girlfriend], and the trial court’s erroneous denial of his motion to suppress certain evidence obtained in violation of his constitutional rights against unreasonable searches and seizures.”
The dissenting vote is unexplained, so it’s unclear what issue or issues attracted Justice Liu’s attention. (There’s a fairly simple cure for that: When a message vote’s message is muddled.) As for the search-and-seizure issue, which might have been the reason Justice Liu wanted to hear the case, Division Four concluded, “(1) the . . . warrant [in issue] was based on information obtained in the course of entries into the [defendant and victim’s] apartment earlier that day that were justified by exigent circumstances and as part of an uninterrupted, minimally intrusive police presence; (2) the challenged evidence would have been inevitably discovered in the course of the proper seizure and examination of [the victim’s] body; (3) Sibilio has forfeited his claim regarding [one piece of seized evidence] by failing to raise it below; and (4) even assuming error, it was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”
A concurring opinion concerned “the trial court’s response to the jury’s question.”
