The Supreme Court’s conference yesterday didn’t yield any straight grants. In the last seven conferences, dating back two months, the court has taken on only two new cases that will lead to opinions.
It was another short-handed conference, with just six justices participating because Governor Newsom has left unfilled an eight-month-long vacancy on the court, a situation that might still continue for a while.
Grant-and-transfer: Palisades fire liability for water utilities
The court granted review in City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court and sent the case back to the Second District, Division Four, Court of Appeal, which had summarily denied the writ petition in the case (“for failure to establish entitlement to extraordinary relief at this time”). Division Four will now decide the petition’s merits in an opinion.
The City of Los Angeles and its Department of Water and Power are seeking to defeat an inverse condemnation claim based on allegations the DWP failed to deliver sufficient water to prevent damage from the January 2025 Pacific Palisades fire. The petition for review claimed the superior court’s overruling of a demurrer “clashes with a century of [Supreme Court] case law holding that water utilities are not liable on those facts, even for negligent failures to deliver water for firefighting.”
The answer to the petition stated “factual issues surrounding Plaintiffs’ allegations that the Santa Ynez Reservoir had been left empty for more than a year, rendering the entire system inoperable, require further development.” The reply to the answer is here.
Another Racial Justice Act OSC
The court issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, in the pro per habeas corpus petition in In re Bibbs, involving a claim under California’s Racial Justice Act (see here, here, and here).
Cause is to be shown “why petitioner is not entitled to the appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e)(5) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of the Racial Justice Act] in light of statistical data cited by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of firearm use enhancements in Los Angeles County and to the disclosure of discovery pursuant to Penal Code, section 745, subdivision (d) [providing for the disclosure of evidence relevant to a potential violation of the Racial Justice Act in the possession or control of the state].”
The court has made many orders like this before. (See here and, recently, here.)
Dissenting votes: conflict about reduced sentence presumptions
Justices Groban and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the court’s denial of review in People v. Nielsen. A divided First District, Division Four, published opinion concluded the superior court didn’t fail to consider the Penal Code section 170(b)(6) presumption that a lower sentencing term should be imposed when, among other things, “childhood trauma” was “a contributing factor in the commission of the offense.”
The dissenting justice criticized the majority for “repudiati[ng] . . . the standard our Division Five colleagues set forth in People v. Fredrickson (2023) 90 Cal.App.5th 984, 991.” Fredrickson stated “the record must ‘affirmatively’ show compliance with a statutory sentencing mandate whenever the mandate has been ‘trigger[ed]’ by an ‘initial showing’ of the applicability of the statute.” The Nielsen majority assumed the presumption had been triggered, but, despite the lack of an affirmative showing of compliance, concluded that the Fredrickson statement was dictum (there was no “initial showing” in Fredrickson) and that “the record does not raise serious doubts or show that the court was unaware of, or failed to apply, section 1170(b)(6).”
The Supreme Court denied the defendant’s petition for review in Fredrickson with Justice Groban recording a dissenting vote.
Dissenting vote: implied malice in vehicular murder case
The court denied review in People v. Bunn, but Justice Liu recorded a vote to grant. In an unpublished opinion, the Fourth District, Division Three, affirmed a second degree murder conviction for a defendant who killed her passenger in a car crash while she was driving drunk.
Division Three rejected an argument that the jury wasn’t properly instructed on the implied malice necessary to sustain the murder charge. The defendant unsuccessfully claimed the jurors should have been told they needed to find her conduct involved a high degree of probability that death would result.
Implied malice murder has been on Justice Liu’s (and Justice Evans’s) radar for a while now. (See here, here, here, and, recently, here; but see here.)
Dissenting vote: voluntary manslaughter
Justice Evans recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in People v. Jordan. The Fifth District unpublished opinion affirmed a second degree murder conviction, finding unavailing a contention the superior court should have instructed the jury on voluntary manslaughter based on provocation.
The appellate court said that the “heat of passion” requirement for manslaughter is both objective and subjective and that “the evidence does not support a finding in defendant’s favor on the objective prong.”
Dissenting votes: youth offender parole denial
Justices Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Betancourt. The Second District, Division Four, in an unpublished opinion, rejected constitutional challenges to a statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed between ages 18 and 25. The defendant was 24 at the time of the murder.
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. After Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from review denials in youth offender parole denial cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed. (See here and recently here; see also here.)
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were four criminal case grant-and-holds: two more waiting for a decision in People v. Munoz (see here), one more holding for People v. Allen (see here and here), and one more on hold for People v. Eaton (see here).
The two Munoz grant-and-holds fit a pattern. In Munoz, the court will decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here.) So far, it looks like the court might find a 50 years to life sentence — but not a lesser one — is cause for relief. (See here; see also recently here.) Thus, yesterday, the court didn’t let stand — at least for now — either the Second District, Division Five, 2-1 unpublished opinion in People v. De La Cruz that found a 45 years to life sentence is the functional equivalent of LWOP or the Second District, Division Four, unpublished opinion in People v. Lawson that held a 50 years to life sentence is not the functional equivalent of LWOP.
Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here)
The court removed from its docket 17 cases that had been grant-and-holds for last month’s murder resentencing opinion in People v. Lopez (2026) 19 Cal.5th 639 (see here). Review was dismissed in three, 13 were returned to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Lopez, and one was remanded for reconsideration in light of both Lopez and this month’s murder resentencing decision in People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 (see here and here).
