Yesterday we summarized some of the major actions taken at this week’s Supreme Court conference. Today, we report on others — dissenting votes in four cases.
Dissenting vote: youth offender LWOP sentence for kidnapping
Justice Kelli Evans dissented from the denial of review in People v. Christensen. In a published opinion, the Fourth District, Division Three, Court of Appeal upheld a life without parole sentence for aggravated kidnapping committed when the defendant was 18.
The defendant claimed his sentence was cruel and/or unusual punishment under the U.S. and California constitutions. (It’s “and” in the U.S. constitution and “or” in California’s.) His unsuccessful arguments were, first, that the constitutional ban on LWOP sentences for minors should be extended to 18-year-old offenders and, second, that, as paraphrased in the opinion, “his sentence is disproportionate to his culpability under the California Constitution.” Regarding the latter, Division Three concluded the defendant’s “sentence is proportionate based on his inhumane conduct during the kidnapping and his criminal history.”
Dissenting votes: implied malice murder
The court denied review in People v. Romero with Justices Goodwin Liu and Evans recording dissenting votes. A 2-1 Fourth District, Division One, unpublished opinion affirmed a second degree murder conviction based on the defendant’s providing a fatal dose of fentanyl to the victim.
The majority rejected a claim there was insufficient evidence that consuming the pills containing fentanyl objectively involved a high probability of death or that the defendant subjectively believed the pills to be dangerous. It also found unavailing an argument that “ ‘[t]he omission of the Reyes definition of “dangerous to human life” rendered CALCRIM No. 520 unconstitutionally vague, lowered the prosecution’s burden of proof, and violated [the defendant’s] constitutional right to a jury determination of all facts required for conviction.’ (People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981, 989.” (Regarding Reyes, see here.)
The dissent “disagree[d] substantial evidence supports the subjective component of implied malice.”
Implied malice murder has been on Justices Liu’s and Evans’s radar for a while now. (See here, here, and here.)
Dissenting vote: juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing
Justice Evans also recorded a dissenting vote in People v. Lopez. A Second District, Division Five, unpublished opinion affirmed the denial of a resentencing petition by a defendant serving 40 years to life for a murder committed when he was 15.
The defendant sought relief under Penal Code section 1170, which generally permits resentencing of some defendants who were sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed when they were minors, and under the Fourth District, Division One, decision in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, which held that, consistent with equal protection principles, resentencing must also be allowed for those sentenced to the “functional equivalent of life without parole.”
Division Five held the sentence was not functionally equivalent to an LWOP sentence because “defendant will be, at most, 55 years old at the time he becomes eligible for parole.” The court continued, “Given that defendant is in sufficiently good health that he is not being treated by any medication and is able to work physically demanding prison jobs, . . . for this defendant, 55 is a sufficiently young age to permit defendant to reintegrate into society as a productive and respected citizen.”
In June, the Supreme Court granted review in People v. Munoz to decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here; see also here.)
This week’s denial of review in Lopez is “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after this court decides . . . Munoz.” Justice Evans, along with Justice Goodwin Liu, has dissented in similar cases. (See recently here.)
Dissenting votes: youth offender parole denial
Justices Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Hammond. In an unpublished opinion, the Fifth District rejected constitutional challenges to a statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26.
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. After Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from review denials in youth offender parole cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed. (See here and recently here; see also here.)
