At its first conference of the 2025-2026 term yesterday, the Supreme Court didn’t straight grant any cases, but it did the equivalent by un-holding one matter. Here’s a recap of that and other notable actions.
An un-hold and new lead case for nine other grant-and-holds: forum selection
Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach was one of a number of grant-and-holds waiting for the July forum-selection-clause decision in EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 58. (See here and here.)
However, instead of either dismissing review or remanding the case for reconsideration in light of the decision in the lead case (the actions taken in the vast majority of grant-and-hold cases), the Supreme Court un-held Lathrop and ordered briefing on these issues: “(1) Where a party alleges that enforcement of a forum selection clause would result in a waiver of the party’s unwaivable statutory rights, what is the showing necessary to enforce (or avoid enforcement) of such a clause, and which party bears the burden of proof on the issue? (2) Under what circumstances, if any, does a stipulation to apply California law in the selected forum rebut an allegation that enforcement of a forum selection clause would result in a waiver of a party’s unwaivable statutory rights? (3) If enforcement of a choice of law clause would result in a waiver of a party’s unwaivable statutory rights, is the choice of law clause severable from the remainder of the agreement?”
In a published opinion in Lathrop, the Second District, Division Seven, Court of Appeal, found it was insufficient to enforce a forum selection clause that the defendant had offered to stipulate the substantive provisions of California’s lemon law, Consumer Legal Remedies Act, and “ ‘all other unwaivable California substantive rights,’ ” would apply in the court of the selected forum. The appellate court concluded that the “proposed stipulation would violate California public policy and that, even if it didn’t, [the] proposed stipulation was insufficient to protect the [plaintiffs’] unwaivable statutory rights.”
Additionally, the Supreme Court converted nine other EpicentRx grant-and-holds (see here, here, here, here, here and here) into Lathrop grant-and-holds. But one EpicentRx grant-and-hold was returned to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the EpicentRx opinion. (See below.)
Horvitz & Levy is appellate counsel for the defendants in Lathrop and filed both the successful petition for review and a request for the Supreme Court to do just what it did yesterday, un-hold the case and order briefing.
Review denied: mass shooting liability
The court denied review in Davallou v. County of Santa Clara. The Sixth District’s unpublished opinion affirmed the dismissal on demurrer of wrongful death and contract causes of action brought against a county and its sheriff’s office for the murders of nine people at a Santa Clara Valley Transportation Authority facility in a 2021 mass shooting. The appellate court acknowledged it was “a harsh result,” but concluded “the trial court correctly applied the law in dismissing plaintiffs’ claims.”
The opinion states that claims against private companies responsible for providing security at the facility and one against the Authority “appear to be proceeding.”
Dismissal: Ninth Circuit insurance law question
At the requests of the parties and the Ninth Circuit after a settlement, the Supreme Court “dismissed” “the matter” in Pitt v. Metropolitan Tower Life Insurance Company. The court had agreed to answer a question posed by the federal appeals court about the interpretation of California Insurance Code statutes concerning lapse and termination of life insurance policies “issued or delivered in this state.”
Not that it matters much, but when the court similarly removed from its docket a Ninth Circuit referred-question case in 2014, it “vacated” “the order . . . granting the Ninth Circuit’s request to decide a question of California law.” I like “vacating the order” better than “dismissing the matter.” (See here.)
Dissenting votes: juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing
Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Diaz. The Second District, Division Six, affirmed in an unpublished opinion the denial of a resentencing petition by a defendant who was sentenced to a 40-years-to-life term for an attempted murder committed when he was 17.
The defendant sought relief under Penal Code section 1170, which generally permits resentencing of some defendants who were sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed when they were minors, and under the Fourth District, Division One, decision in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, which held that, consistent with equal protection principles, resentencing must also be allowed for those sentenced to the “functional equivalent of life without parole.” Division Six held the defendant’s sentence was not functionally equivalent to an LWOP sentence because he “will be eligible for parole pursuant to the youthful parole offender scheme” when he will be 42 and also “after serving 40 years, at age 57.”
In June, the Supreme Court granted review in People v. Munoz to decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here; see also here.)
The court’s denial of review in Diaz is “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after this court decides . . . Munoz.” It’s not clear why Diaz is not a grant-and-hold for Munoz under a policy the court adopted ten years ago.
More dissenting votes for review about youth offender parole denial
Justices Liu and Evans also recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Olvera. In an unpublished opinion, the Second District, Division Two, rejected constitutional challenges to the statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26.
In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. After Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from review denials in youth offender parole cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed. (See here and recently here; see also here.)
Dissenting vote: involuntary medication
Justice Liu also recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in People v. Lewis. The First District, Division Two, published (and partially redacted) opinion rejected the defendant’s arguments that his due process and equal protection rights were violated by not affording him an evidentiary hearing before committing him to the California Department of State Hospitals and authorizing it to involuntarily administer antipsychotic medication. The defendant had been found mentally incompetent to stand trial on two assault charges.
Dissenting vote: conditional release from SVPA commitment
Justice Evans also recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in People v. McRoberts. After numerous commitments under the Sexually Violent Predator Act, the defendant was again released, but with 49 conditions. The superior court overruled his objections to 12 of them and the Third District, in an unpublished opinion, rejected his challenge to nine conditions.
Justice Evans’s vote is not explained, so it’s unclear which of the nine conditions she wanted the court to review. (There’s a fairly simple cure for that: When a message vote’s message is muddled.)
Racial Justice Act OSCs
The court issued orders to show cause, returnable in the superior court, in pro per habeas corpus petitions in In re Phillips and In re Scott. Cause is to be shown “why petitioner is not entitled to appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges facts constituting a violation of the Racial Justice Act [here and here]] in light of,” in Phillips, “the data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of firearm enhancements in San Joaquin County,” and in Scott, “statistical data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of Three Strikes sentences in San Diego County.” (Bracketed links added.)
The court has made orders like this before. (See recently here.)
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were three criminal case grant-and-holds this week: one waiting both for a decision in People v. Bankston (see here), which was argued in May, and for the finality of last week’s decision in People v. Aguirre (see here); one more holding for People v. Lopez (see here); and one more on hold for People v. Eaton (see here).
Criminal case grant-and-transfers
In one case, the court granted review and transferred it back to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the April murder-resentencing opinion in People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719 (see here).
Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here)
The court continues to make its way through the large number of cases that were grant-and-holds for the June sentencing retroactivity decision in People v. Rhodius (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1050. 20 were sent back to the Fourth District, Division Two, for reconsideration in light of the Rhodius opinion. Review was dismissed in nine, including three Division Two cases. By our count, the court has now ruled on 184 Rhodius grant-and-holds, including un-holding one and converting many others to grant-and-holds for the un-held one, People v. Espino. (See here, here, here, and here.)
Four cases that had been waiting for the June decision in People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069 (see here) were returned to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Wiley. One case on hold for Wiley and the August 2024 opinion in People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (see here) was transferred for reconsideration in light of both Wiley and Lynch.
The Comedy Store v. Moss Adams LLP was a grant-and-hold for EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court (2025) 18 Cal.5th 58. Instead of converting the case to a grant-and-hold for Lathrop v. Thor Motor Coach, as it did with nine other matters (see above), the Supreme Court transferred the case back to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of EpicentRx. That’s probably because the Supreme Court in EpicentRx disapproved the Court of Appeal Comedy Store opinion. (See here.) The transfer order also vacated the Court of Appeal decision, which makes that court’s opinion “not citable,” the functional equivalent of a depublication. (See here.)
