The Supreme Court didn’t straight grant any cases at yesterday’s conference, but there were some notable rulings, including:
Murder resentencing grant-and-transfer.
The court granted review in another Senate Bill 1437 case, People v. Gray, vacated the unpublished opinion of the Second District, Division One, Court of Appeal, and sent the matter back to the appellate court to reconsider its affirmance of a resentencing petition’s denial “in light of People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451-452.” (Regarding Curiel, see here.) The defendant was sentenced over 40 years ago to life without parole for felony murder after a jury’s true finding of felony-murder special circumstances. The 2018 legislation narrowed felony murder liability and allows for resentencing.
The People conceded in the superior court that the defendant should be resentenced, but the trial judge rejected the concession and Division One, brushing aside the concession, held the special circumstances finding necessarily established the jury had concluded the defendant harbored the intent to kill, a necessary element for felony murder under SB 1437. The Curiel pages cited in the Supreme Court’s order explain what is necessary for a special circumstance finding to have preclusive effect in an SB 1437 resentencing proceeding.
It’s unusual for the Supreme Court to grant-and-transfer for reconsideration in light of authority that was available to the Court of Appeal. Division One’s opinion mentioned Curiel once, concerning a point different than issue preclusion.
Racial Justice Act OSC. The court issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, on a pro per’s habeas corpus petition (filed as a petition for review, but considered a habeas petition by the Supreme Court) in Mitchell v. Superior Court. Cause is to be shown “why the petition does not satisfy the statutory requirements for the appointment of counsel under the Racial Justice Act [see here and here]. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (e) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges facts constituting a violation of the Racial Justice Act].)” The Second District, Division Three, had summarily denied the writ of mandate petition the pro per had filed, concluding he “has not made a prima facie showing that he was charged or convicted of a more serious offense or had a longer or more severe sentence imposed as a result of his race, ethnicity, or national origin.”
Fee waiver denial OSC.
The court granted review in Mockett v. Superior Court and sent the case back to the Fourth District, Division Two (which had summarily denied Mockett’s writ petition) with directions to have “the respondent superior court . . . show cause why the relief sought in the petition should not be granted.”
The petition for review argued the superior court improperly denied Mockett’s application to waive fees, payable to that court, for his appeal (see rules 8.100(b), 8.122(c)) of an adverse civil judgment. The petition quoted the superior court’s reason for the denial, “Attorney can advance fees and costs.” Requiring an indigent litigant’s attorney to advance fees seems contrary to the Supreme Court’s decision in Isrin v. Superior Court (1965) 63 Cal.2d 153, 164–165. The petition didn’t mention Isrin.
The Supreme Court’s order doesn’t mention its Isrin opinion, either, but it does say, “The response to the order to show cause should address the application of Government Code section 68632, subdivision (a)(3).” (Link added.) That statute provides a fee waiver application “shall be granted” to persons “receiving public benefits” under any of a variety of different federal and state programs, including food stamps, which Mockett said he receives.
When Mockett submitted his petition for review to the Supreme Court, the court granted his concurrently submitted application for waiver of that court’s fees. That just might be a hint of how the court wants the writ petition to be decided.
Capitol renovation green light. The court denied review in Save Our Capitol! v. Department of General Services. The Third District’s published opinion affirmed the rejection of a challenge to an environmental impact report on proposed substantial changes to California’s capitol. The appellate court based its decision on action taken by the capitol building’s occupants: “after two adverse appellate decisions, and with this third appeal pending, the Legislature decided to exempt the project from further CEQA review.” The exempting legislation “dictates the result in this appeal,” the opinion stated. There’s also considerable discussion about budget bills, trailer bills, and urgency legislation in determining that the exemption doesn’t violate a state constitutional section limiting legislative actions that would authorize certain changes to the capitol.
Criminal case grant-and-holds. There were eight criminal case grant-and-holds: two more waiting for a decision in People v. Patton (see here), which was argued last month; one more holding for People v. Fletcher (see here); two more waiting for People v. Lopez (see here), the opinion in which was filed today; one more holding for In re Hernandez (see here); and two more on hold for People v. Rhodius (see here).
Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here).
Stiles v. Kia Motors America, Inc., which was a grant-and-hold (see here) waiting for the October Lemon Law decision in Rodriguez v. FCA US, LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189 (see here), was returned to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Rodriguez. Horvitz & Levy represented the prevailing defendant in Rodriguez and represents the defendant in Stiles.
The court disposed of 10 cases that were holding for the August youth offender parole decision in People v. Williams (2024) 17 Cal.5th 99 (see here). Review was dismissed in six and four were sent back to the Courts of Appeal for reconsideration in light of the Williams opinion. And one case that was on hold for decisions in Williams, In re Vaquera (2024) 15 Cal.5th 706 (see here), and People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834 (see here), was returned to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of just Vaquera.
