Here’s the second part of the report on yesterday’s conference. Part I, discussing two of the four straight grants and other things, is here.
Warrantless car search.
The court granted review in Sellers v. Superior Court and it limited the issues to: “1. Does the presence of 0.36 grams of loose marijuana on the floor of a vehicle constitute an open container violation under Health & Safety Code, section 11362.3, subdivision (a)(4)? 2. Does the answer to this question affect whether there was probable cause for a warrantless vehicle search under the totality of the circumstances, such that remand would be required for reconsideration of the Court of Appeal’s alternative analysis, Sellers v. Superior Court (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 468, 478-479?” (Link added.)
A 2-1 Third District published opinion upheld a warrantless search, relying on an argument the prosecution had abandoned. Section 11362.3 prohibits a driver from “[p]ossess[ing] an open container or open package of cannabis or cannabis products” (emphasis added), but the majority held, “we construe the statute, consistent with its apparent purpose, to prohibit any person from possessing marijuana that is not in a closed package or container while driving” (original emphasis). Alternatively, the opinion said, “even if we were to conclude the loose marijuana was not contraband, we are persuaded that the totality of the circumstances observed by the police officers gave probable cause to search the vehicle.”
The dissent noted the search followed “what was clearly a targeted traffic stop of a car that appears to have contained African-American and Hispanic individuals.” The justice also wrote, “I agree with the Attorney General’s concession at oral argument that scattered marijuana on a car’s floorboards does not constitute an open container of marijuana” and she stated her disagreement with the majority’s conclusion that the “totality of the circumstances” justified the warrantless search.
CEQA exemption for oil well project. The court will also hear Sunflower Alliance v. California Department of Conservation and it limited the issues to: “(1) May an agency claim a categorical exemption from environmental review under [the California Environmental Quality Act] while also adopting conditions of approval relating to potential environmental effects? (2) Does the term ‘negligible’ in the California Environmental Quality Act’s Class 1 existing facilities exemption (Cal. Code Regs., tit. 14, § 15301) pertain to a negligible change in use or to a change that presents a negligible risk of environmental harm?” As described in the First District, Division Five, published opinion, the case involves “a project to convert an oil well, which formerly pumped oil and water from an aquifer, into an injection well, which would pump excess water back into the aquifer.” Division Five held the project was exempt from CEQA under the Act’s guidelines — “any expansion of the well’s use is negligible because, under the facts here, the environmental risks of injecting the water are negligible.”
Expert testimony gatekeeper depublication. The court granted the People’s request to depublish the First District, Division Three, opinion in People v. Tidd. There was no petition for review. Division Three reversed a conviction for assault with a firearm and discharge of a firearm from a motor vehicle because it found “no sufficient basis for [the] opinion” of a firearms toolmark analyst “that a cartridge case recovered from a crime scene had been fired from a particular gun.” The appellate court concluded the problem was, “The People introduced no studies to support the assumptions on which [the expert’s] forensic technique relies, and no evidence that [his] admittedly subjective assessment was in any way reliable.”
Racial Justice Act OSC. The court issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, in the pro per’s habeas corpus petition in In re Petty. The issue is whether the petitioner is “entitled to relief based on his claim the prosecutor’s comparison of petitioner to a Bengal tiger during closing argument violated the Racial Justice Act. (See Pen. Code, § 745, subds. (a)(2), (h)(4).)”
Another vehicle sales arbitration grant-and-hold. Rivera v. Superior Court is another grant-and-hold for the Ford Motor Warranty Cases (see here), where the court limited the issue to: “Do manufacturers’ express or implied warranties that accompany a vehicle at the time of sale [by a dealer] constitute obligations arising from the sale contract [between the dealer and a buyer], permitting manufacturers to enforce an arbitration agreement in the contract pursuant to equitable estoppel?” The Second District, Division Six, published opinion, held that the car manufacturer in the case “is not a third party beneficiary of the sale contract and petitioners are not estopped from objecting to arbitration.”
Another forum selection grant-and-hold. Lockton Companies, LLC – Pacific Series v. Superior Court (McClave) is another grant-and-hold for EpicentRx, Inc. v. Superior Court (see here), which is expected to decide whether a forum selection clause is enforceable when a party’s right under California state law to a jury trial for their civil claims would not apply in the exclusive forum identified by the clause. The McClave writ petition was summarily denied by the Second District, Division Three. There are a bunch more Lockton Companies grant-and-holds. (See here, here, and here.) Also, another pending review-granted case about forum selection clauses is Zhang v. Superior Court (see here).
Plea bargains and resentencing. In May, the court granted the People’s petition for review in People v. Montgomery to resolve a conflict in Court of Appeal decisions concerning whether the prosecution is entitled to rescind a plea agreement when a defendant receives a full resentencing under Senate Bill No. 483 (Stats. 2021, ch. 728) and the trial court intends to reduce the sentence beyond eliminating the prior prison term enhancements (Pen. Code, § 667.5, subd. (b)). (See here.) Yesterday, with the answer brief having been filed two months ago, the court granted the defendant’s motion to transfer the case back to the First District, Division Three, with directions to reconsider the cause in light of Assembly Bill No. 2483 (Stats. 2024, ch. 964). The new law says the legislation is intended to “[c]reat[e] uniform resentencing procedures.”
Murder resentencing dissenting votes. The court denied review in People v. Gomez, but Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans recorded votes to hear the case. In an unpublished opinion, the Second District, Division Seven, affirmed the denial of the defendant’s petition for resentencing under statutory changes limiting murder liability for accomplices. The defendant didn’t contend there was a lack of substantial evidence to support the superior court’s findings on which the denial was based, but he claimed error in failing to consider his youth (he was 23 years old at the time of the crime; “on the older end of the youthful offender spectrum,” the opinion noted) in determining whether he acted with the requisite mental state for second degree murder. Division Seven held that “[a]ny error . . . was harmless” because it was not reasonably probable that considering his youth would have led to a more favorable result.
Another murder resentencing dissenting vote. Justice Evans alone dissented from the denial of review in People v. Zavala. The Third District published opinion affirmed the denial of the defendant’s petition for resentencing under statutory changes limiting murder liability for accomplices. The appellate court rejected the argument the trial court erroneously admitted statements defendant made during a parole risk assessment interview and testimony from the parole hearing. The opinion stated, “defendant has not shown that . . . his statements . . . were involuntary or coerced.”
More dissenting votes for review about youth offender parole denial. Justices Liu and Evans also recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Blanche and People v. Johnson. Unpublished opinions by the Second District, Division Seven, in Blanche and by the Second District, Division Four, in Johnson rejected constitutional challenges to the statute that prevents parole hearings for defendants serving life without parole sentences for special circumstances murders committed when older than 17 and younger than 26. In People v. Hardin (2024) 15 Cal.5th 834, the Supreme Court found unavailing an equal protection attack. (See here.) Justices Liu and Evans dissented there. After Hardin, they have been regularly dissenting from review denials in youth offender parole cases, including once with a separate statement asserting that cruel-or-unusual-punishment issues should be addressed. (See here and recently here.)
Criminal case grant-and-holds. There were three criminal case grant-and-holds: one more waiting for a decision in People v. Patton (see here), which was argued two weeks ago (video here); one more holding for People v. Rhodius (see here); and one more on hold for People v. Superior Court (Guevara) (see here and here).
Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here). The court dismissed review in two cases — Dhital v. Nissan North America (see here) and Kia America, Inc. v. Superior Court (see here) — that had been waiting for the August economic-loss-rule decision in Rattagan v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2024) 17 Cal.5th 1 (see here). It also dismissed review in a case that was on hold for People v. Montgomery (see above).
