At its conference yesterday, the Supreme Court straight granted two cases — one civil and one criminal — involving minors, one child a victim and one a perpetrator. Those and some other notable actions were:
Childhood sexual assault immunity
The court granted review in K.C. v. County of Merced. The Fifth District Court of Appeal’s belatedly published opinion held a negligence action against a county and its social workers for repeated sexual assault of a child in foster care was barred by discretionary immunity statutes in the Government Code (here and here). The appellate court said “[t]he social workers’ decisions at issue relate to ‘the investigation of child abuse’ and discontinuation of a foster home placement ‘based upon suspicion of abuse.’ ” (Citations omitted.)
In a footnote, the Fifth District seemed to acknowledge its decision was different than the Fourth District, Division Three, opinion in D.G. v. Orange County Social Services Agency (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 465, but concluded D.G. was “inapposite” because D.G. “addressed . . . whether discretionary immunity was a proper basis for granting summary judgment ” (emphasis added), while the K.C. case concerned the “sustention of a demurrer.” There was no petition for review in D.G.
An even more recent Fifth District opinion, a nonpub, in a similar case distinguished D.G. in the same way as K.C. did. A petition for review in that case — S.C. v. County of Fresno — is pending and the case is an excellent grant-and-hold candidate.
[June 27 update: Here is the issue as summarized by court staff (see here) — “Was plaintiff’s complaint alleging that a social worker failed to investigate or act in response to claims of sexual abuse subject to demurrer on the ground that discretionary act immunity under Government Code section 820.2 precluded liability?”]
Juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing
The court also agreed to hear People v. Munoz. A 2-1 published opinion by the Second District, Division Seven, affirmed the denial of a resentencing petition filed by a defendant serving a 50-years-to-life prison term for murder committed in 2006 when he was 15.
The defendant sought relief under Penal Code section 1170(d)(1), which permits resentencing “[w]hen a defendant who was under 18 years of age at the time of the commission of the offense for which the defendant was sentenced to imprisonment for life without the possibility of parole has been incarcerated for at least 15 years.” Although the defendant wasn’t sentenced to life without parole, the Fourth District, Division One, in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, and the Second District, Division Three, in People v. Sorto (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 435, have held the statute denies equal protection by precluding a resentencing opportunity for those “who were sentenced to the functional equivalent of life without parole.” (There was no petition for review in Heard or Sorto.)
Rejecting the Attorney General’s concession to the contrary, the Division Seven majority in Munoz concluded the defendant’s sentence was not the “functional equivalent” of a life without parole term. The dissent asserted that it was and that denying the defendant the chance for relief under section 1170 was an equal protection violation.
Defendants have been unsuccessfully knocking at the Supreme Court’s door with the section 1170 “functional equivalent” issue for a while now. Only Justices Goodwin Liu and Kelli Evans have wanted to grant review in the prior cases, in which the Courts of Appeal had found sentences of 33-, 40-, and 45-years-to-life to not be functionally equivalent to LWOP terms. (See here, here, and here.)
Munoz already has its own grant-and-hold. (See below.)
[June 27 update: Here is the issue as summarized by court staff (see here) — “Is a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison entitled to recall and resentencing under Penal Code section 1170, subdivision (d)(1) on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole?”]
Sentence commutation approved
The court granted Governor Gavin Newsom’s May request for a constitutionally required recommendation that allows him to commute Jonathan Cannon’s 2010 27-year sentence for robbery with sentence enhancements. The request said, “The Governor is contemplating a commutation . . . would make Mr. Cannon eligible for earlier release” than his “currently eligible” release date of May 29, 2026.
Newsom has a nearly perfect clemency record: he withdrew one request before a ruling, but the court — applying a deferential standard (see here and here) — has approved all 73 of his other requests (not counting 9 that are still pending (see here and here)). That’s better than former Governor Jerry Brown, who had the court without explanation block 10 intended clemency grants. The denial of a request implies that a clemency grant would be an abuse of power.
Charter school dissenting vote
The court denied review in Napa Valley Unified School District v. State Board of Education, but Justice Joshua Groban recorded a vote to grant. The Third District’s belatedly published opinion upheld the denial of a petition to establish a charter middle school. The State Board of Education had reversed the denial (by a school district and a county board of education), but the Third District concluded “the State Board incorrectly determined that the District Board and County Board abused their discretion.”
Speedy preliminary hearing grant-and-transfer
The court granted review in Benavides v. Superior Court and sent the case back to the Second District, Division Five, which had, by a 2-1 vote, summarily denied the defendant’s writ petition in the case. Division Five is directed to decide the writ petition on its merits. The petition for review states the issue is whether Penal Code section 859b required the superior court to dismiss the felony assault complaint against the defendant because the defendant was “in custody” and his preliminary hearing was “set or continued beyond 10 court days from the time of the arraignment.”
The court issued a grant-and-transfer in another section 859b case earlier this month. (See here.)
Racial Justice Act grant-and-transfer, OSC
The court also granted and transferred in In re Sholes. The Fifth District, which had summarily denied the pro per habeas corpus petition, is directed to issue an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, “why the petition does not satisfy the statutory requirements for the appointment of counsel under the Racial Justice Act [here and here]. (Pen. Code, § 1473, subd. (e) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges facts constituting a violation of the Racial Justice Act].” (Links added.)
In In re Robinson, another pro per habeas petition, but this one filed directly in the Supreme Court, the court issued an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, “why petitioner is not entitled to appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e), in light of data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in sentencing under the Three Strikes law.”
The court has made orders like these before. (See recently here.)
Racial Justice Act depublication denial
The court denied the San Bernardino County District Attorney’s request to depublish the Fourth District, Division One, opinion in McIntosh v. Superior Court. Division One held the superior court had improperly analyzed the defendant’s request for appointment of counsel to pursue a claim under the Racial Justice Act (here and here) that he, a Black man, had been disparately charged with, and sentenced for, two sentence enhancements due to his race.
The superior court denied the counsel request based on its finding the defendant had not met the prima facie showing for issuance of an order to show cause. Disagreeing with both parties, the appellate court said trial courts must consider counsel requests “based on an assessment of the adequacy of the factual allegations in the habeas petition, not an assessment of the overall sufficiency of the prima facie showing that must be met to obtain an OSC.” “This is a distinction with a difference,” the court concluded.
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were a dozen criminal case grant-and-holds: one more waiting for a decision in People v. Cannon (see here), which was argued last month; 10 more holding for People v. Rhodius (see here), which was decided today; and one on hold for People v. Munoz (see above).
Grant-and-hold disposition (see here)
The court dismissed review in four cases that had been holding for the April murder-resentencing opinion in People v. Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719 (see here), and it sent another one back to the Court of Appeal for reconsideration in light of Antonelli.
