Valentine v. Plum Healthcare Group, LLC (July 2, 2019, No. C080940) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2019 WL 3338166], certified for publication July 25, 2019
Lila Valentine was admitted to the Midtown Oaks Post-Acute skilled nursing facility to rehabilitate a fractured shoulder. Lila’s husband signed the admission papers, which included two arbitration agreements. Under these agreements, Lila’s husband represented that he had authority to execute them on her behalf and to bind all “heirs, representatives, executors, administrators, successors, and assigns.” Lila developed a urinary tract infection, which led to sepsis and death from cardiac arrest. Lila’s husband and children sued Midtown for wrongful death, elder abuse, violations of the patient’s bill of rights, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. Midtown petitioned to compel arbitration. The trial court ruled that the arbitration agreements applied to the husband’s claims (both as Lila’s successor in interest and for himself), but not to the children’s wrongful death claims because they had not signed. The court then refused to compel arbitration—even as to the husband—because arbitrating some claims and litigating others might result in conflicting rulings on common issues.
The Court of Appeal affirmed. The court explained that a patient may execute an arbitration agreement that binds her heirs, requiring them to arbitrate any wrongful death claim. But Midtown failed to establish that Lila’s husband was acting as her authorized agent when he executed the arbitration agreements on her behalf. The court held such agency cannot be implied from the marriage relationship alone. Midtown’s ostensible agency theory failed because Lila had done nothing to cause Midtown to believe her husband was authorized to sign the admissions papers for her. Although Lila’s fractured shoulder prevented her from signing herself, Midtown had not shown that she lacked capacity to make healthcare decisions or to communicate her consent. Finally, the court held that the trial court had the discretion to deny otherwise proper arbitration of the husband’s individual claims to order to avoid inconsistent results.
