Ruling on a whopping 206 matters at its double conference yesterday, the Supreme Court took a number of notable actions. The number is so big that it will require more than one blog post for a recap, but here’s a start.
Youth offender parole limit
See: A third vote for review, and another separate statement, on youth offender parole.
Resentencing error
The court granted review in People v. Eaton. It’s the second grant of review in the case. After the Third District Court of Appeal rejected an argument that a resentencing court had erred in relying on aggravating circumstances that were not properly proven, the Supreme Court granted and held the case and later returned it — as the court did with a number of other matters — for reconsideration in light of both People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (see here) and Erlinger v. United States (2024) 602 U.S. 821. (Here and here.)
On remand, the Third District didn’t change its mind, coming to the same conclusion in an unpublished opinion. Relying on its prior decision in People v. Brannon-Thompson (2024) 104 Cal.App.5th 455, the appellate court held that “the trial court did not err in reimposing the upper term because aggravating circumstances need not be proven beyond a reasonable doubt at a section 1172.75 resentencing if the court previously imposed the upper term.”
The Sixth District disagreed with Brannon-Thompson in People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 312. In Eaton II, the Third District in turn disagreed with Gonzalez. There was no petition for review in either Brannon-Thompson or Gonzalez.
[May 16 update: Here is the issue as summarized by court staff (see here) — “May a trial court reimpose a previously imposed upper term sentence under Penal Code section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(4) where the facts underlying one or more aggravating circumstances were neither stipulated to by the defendant nor found true beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial (cf. Pen. Code, § 1170, subd. (b)(2); id., § 1172.75, subd. (d)(2))?”]
Defamation of employee
The court also granted review in Hearn v. Pacific Gas & Electric Company and it limited the issue to: “May a terminated employee bring a defamation claim against a former employer when the defamation allegedly contributed to the reasons for the termination of that employment or must such a claim be pursued under a wrongful discharge theory?”
The 2-1 partially published opinion of the First District, Division Three, reversed a more than $2,000,000 award for an employee after a jury found the employee had been defamed by his employer but it also rejected the employee’s retaliation claim. The majority held the employee “may not recover for defamation when it arose from the same conduct giving rise to his termination and the only result is the loss of his employment. In other words, Hearn cannot recover damages for wrongful termination by recasting his claim as one for defamation.”
The dissent asserted that the employer “seeks to impose on Hearn an additional element he must prove regarding his damages, an element that is foreign to the well-established cause of action for defamation and creates a special exemption from tort liability for employers who defame employees in the course of terminating their employment.”
[May 19 update: Horvitz & Levy submitted a letter opposing a request to depublish the Court of Appeal opinion. In addition to granting review, the Supreme Court denied the depublication request.]
Parental rights termination
The court agreed to hear the related matters of In re Z.G. and In re A.G. In Z.G., the court limited the issue to: “Can parental rights properly be terminated pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 366.26, subdivision (c)(1) when a parent did not receive reunification services and was not bypassed for such services?”
In a 2-1 unpublished opinion, the Fourth District, Division Two, found legislation had made obsolete the Supreme Court’s statement in In re DeLonnie S. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1109, 1113, that “the fact that a dependent child is likely to be adopted will not by itself support an order terminating parental rights.” Division Two held, “because the court was not required to find that reunification services as to A.G. had been bypassed, the court did not err in terminating mother’s parental rights because it had determined that A.G. was adoptable.”
[May 16 update: Here is the issue in A.G. as summarized by court staff (see here) — “This case presents issues relating to claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in connection with juvenile dependency proceedings resulting in the termination of petitioner’s parental rights.”]
Headless PAGA grant-and-hold
Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services Ltd., LLC is a grant-and-hold for Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (see here), in which the court limited the issues to: “1.) Does every Private Attorneys General Act (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.) (PAGA) action necessarily include both individual and non-individual PAGA claims, regardless of whether the complaint specifically alleges individual claims? 2.) Can a plaintiff choose to bring only a non-individual PAGA action?”
The Fourth District, Division One, published opinion in Rodriguez disagreed with the Second District, Division One, Leeper decision. The Fourth District concluded that every PAGA complaint doesn’t necessarily include an individual claim, that the complaint before it did not include such a claim, and that a motion to compel arbitration was thus properly denied. Division One didn’t decide, however, whether “it is permissible for a plaintiff to file a complaint that asserts only non-individual PAGA claims”; it left for later a decision whether the complaint was subject to a challenge as not having been properly pleaded.
Because the underlying Leeper lawsuit has been dismissed at the plaintiff’s request, we guessed the Supreme Court would dismiss review in Leeper and straight grant Rodriguez. It’s possible the court hasn’t yet decided what to do with Leeper and still might at some point dismiss review in that case and un-hold Rodriguez.
Murder resentencing depublication
The court denied review in People v. Villagrana, but it depublished the Second District, Division Six, 2-1 opinion. Rejecting the Attorney General’s confession of error, the majority affirmed the denial of an SB 1437 murder resentencing petition. It concluded, “drawing all inferences in favor of the trial court’s findings, a rational trier of fact could reasonably have found appellant guilty, beyond a reasonable doubt, as a direct aider and abettor to murder, if not as the actual shooter.”
The dissent contended “the evidence relied on by the trial court . . . does not prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that [the defendant] is guilty of [the victim’s] murder.” The majority accused the dissent of “reweigh[ing] the evidence.”
[May 19 update: the depublication came at the request of the Office of the State Public Defender. The depublication request letter explains in detail the flaws the Public Defender sees in the Court of Appeal majority opinion.]
Childhood sexual assault dissenting votes.
Justice Joshua Groban recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in Doe v. Acalanes Union High School District. The First District, Division Five, in an unpublished opinion, reversed a superior court finding that had declared unconstitutional Assembly Bill 218, which revived claims against public entities “for the recovery of damages suffered as a result of childhood sexual assault.”
Public entities have argued the legislation violates the California Constitution’s prohibition against gifts of public funds (Cal. Const., art. XVI, § 6). Justice Groban has previously dissented from the denial of review in similar cases (see here and here) and might be the lone member of the court who ever votes to decide the issue, unless a Court of Appeal declares AB 218 unconstitutional (see: The Supreme Court doesn’t decide all important issues.)
