Hutcheson v. Eskaton FountainWood Lodge (Nov. 28, C074846) __ Cal.App.5th __ [2017 WL 5712590] [June 16, 2017 CSHA bulletin addressed the June 14, 2017 opinion, which was vacated by grant of rehearing and superseded by this opinion]
Decedent Barbara Lovenstein appointed her niece, Robin Hutcheson, as attorney-in-fact to make health care decisions under the Health Care Decision Law (Prob. Code, § 4600 et seq. (HCDL)), and appointed both her sister, Jean Charles, and Hutcheson as attorneys-in-fact for personal care matters under the Power of Attorney Law (Prob. Code, § 4000 et seq. (PAL)). Charles later admitted Lovenstein to Eskaton FountainWood Lodge, which is licensed as a residential care facility for the elderly under the California Residential Care Facilities for the Elderly Act (Health & Saf. Code, § 1569 et seq.). She executed an admissions agreement on Lovenstein’s behalf that contained an arbitration provision.
Lovenstein later died after being hospitalized for aspiration pneumonia and severe dysphagia that she contracted after choking on food at FountainWood. Hutcheson and Charles sued FountainWood for elder abuse, fraud, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The trial court denied FountainWood’s petition to compel arbitration, ruling that the admission agreement was invalid because Charles’ admission of Lovenstein to FountainWood was a health care decision beyond the scope of her authority as a personal care attorney-in-fact. FountainWood appealed.
The Court of Appeal affirmed, holding that Charles lacked authority to execute the admissions agreement because FountainWood agreed to provide Lovenstein with dementia care, a form of healthcare bringing the admissions agreement within the ambit of the HCDL. Because FountainWood had received the health care power of attorney naming Hutcheson as attorney-in-fact, and therefore knew that Charles lacked authority to make health care decisions for Lovenstein, FountainWood could not enforce the arbitration clause (since a known health care attorney-in-fact has priority over any other person to make health care decisions). The court explained that the scope of the HCDL is broad, and applies to facilities providing health care services, including dementia care, even if those facilities do not meet the narrower definition of health facility under MICRA and other statutes. (The court’s initial decision affirmed the judgment, but the court granted rehearing and issued this new opinion, likewise affirming, to clarify what constitutes a “health care facility” and to explain that FountainWood knew Hutcheson had authority to make health care decisions.)
Thomas Watson
htwatson@horvitzlevy.com
Horvitz & Levy LLP
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