At its day-early conference with just six justices, the Supreme Court didn’t straight grant any cases, but there were rulings (and a non-ruling) of importance, including:
Racial Justice Act OSCs
The court issued orders to show cause, returnable in the superior court, in two pro pers’ habeas corpus petitions — In re Davis and In re Oden.
Cause is to be shown why the petitioners are “not entitled to appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who alleges facts constituting a violation of the Racial Justice Act] in light of statistical data” the petitioners provided “demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of Three Strikes sentences” in Alameda County (Davis) and in Los Angeles County (Oden); also in Oden “in light of comments by the trial court during sentencing.” Section 1473 is part of California’s Racial Justice Act (see here, here, and here).
The court has made many orders like this before. (See here and, recently, here.)
Racial Justice Act dissenting vote
There may be life in the Davis and Oden habeas corpus petitions (see above), but the court denied another pro per’s RJA petition in In re Murray. The denial did draw a recorded dissenting vote from Justice Kelli Evans, however.
The court’s order relates, “petitioner alleges he was charged or convicted of a more serious offense than defendants of other races, ethnicities, or national origins who have engaged in similar conduct and are similarly situated; prosecutors in Monterey County more frequently sought or obtained convictions for more serious offenses against people who share his race, ethnicity, or national origin; and he received a longer or more severe sentence compared to similarly situated individuals convicted of the same offense and longer or more severe sentences were more frequently imposed for the same offense on defendants who share petitioner’s race, ethnicity, or national origin in Monterey County.”
The court concluded “[t]he petition does not satisfy the statutory requirements for the appointment of counsel under the Racial Justice Act” because “Petitioner fails to allege particularized facts that support a claim that he was charged, convicted, or sentenced in a more severe manner than similarly situated individuals of other races, ethnicities, or national origins.” The denial, however, is “without prejudice to any relief to which petitioner might be entitled after this court decides [In re Montgomery] [see here].”
Review dismissed/depublication equivalent: arbitration/forum selection
The court dismissed review in Zhang v. Superior Court, in which the court granted review nearly three years ago (it was one of the oldest non-capital cases on the court’s docket) to decide the issues (as summarized by court staff): “(1) If an employer files a motion to compel arbitration in a non-California forum pursuant to a contractual forum-selection clause, and an employee raises as a defense Labor Code section 925, which prohibits an employer from requiring a California employee to agree to a provision requiring the employee to adjudicate outside of California a claim arising in California, is the court in the non-California forum one of ‘competent jurisdiction’ (Code Civ. Proc., § 1281.4) such that the motion to compel requires a mandatory stay of the California proceedings? (2) Does the presence of a delegation clause in an employment contract delegating issues of arbitrability to an arbitrator prohibit a California court from enforcing Labor Code section 925 in opposition to the employer’s stay motion?” More about the case here.
The court said the dismissal was made “[i]n light of procedural developments associated with the motion to compel arbitration.”
The court also ordered the Second District, Division Eight, Court of Appeal’s published opinion to be “not citable and nonprecedential.” Meaning, if the opinion weren’t already in a bound volume of the official reports, the court would have depublished it.
Clemency recommendation
The court granted Governor Gavin Newsom’s October request (see here) for the constitutionally required recommendation that allows him to commute April Pitts’s sentence. The Governor’s request stated, “In 2012, Ms. Pitts was convicted of robbery with a sentence enhancement. She was sentenced to a prison term of 30 years to life. Ms. Pitts has prior felony convictions for forgery (2004), receiving stolen property (2004), burglary (2007), and check fraud (2007).”
The court’s recommendation noted that the request stated, “The Governor is contemplating a commutation of sentence that would make Ms. Pitts eligible for an earlier parole suitability hearing.” (Related: “Newsom grants clemency, but freedom isn’t certain”.)
Newsom has a nearly perfect clemency record: he withdrew one request before a ruling, but the court — applying a deferential standard (see here and here) — has approved all 87 of his other requests. (Not counting five requests that are still pending.) That’s better than former Governor Jerry Brown, who had the court without explanation block 10 intended clemency grants. The denial of a request implies that a clemency grant would be an abuse of power.
Dissenting vote: juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing
The court denied review in People v. Baldwin, but Justice Evans recorded a vote to grant. In a published opinion, the Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed the denial of a resentencing petition by a defendant serving 44 years to life for rape, home invasion robbery, and numerous other crimes committed 24 years ago when he was 16.
Baldwin sought relief under Penal Code section 1170, which generally permits resentencing of some defendants who were sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed when they were minors, and under the Fourth District, Division One, decision in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, which held that, consistent with equal protection principles, resentencing must also be allowed for those sentenced to the “functional equivalent of life without parole.”
The Attorney General initially conceded that Baldwin’s sentence was LWOP functionally equivalent, but withdrew the concession in supplemental briefing. The Fifth District concluded that the Legislature had a rational basis for excluding from section 1170 resentencing relief “juveniles with lengthy term-of-years sentences that do not guarantee their death in prison.”
In June, the Supreme Court granted review in People v. Munoz to decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here; see also here.)
50 years to life sentences are getting the court’s attention; lesser, but still very lengthy, sentences, not so much. (See here.)
The Baldwin denial of review is “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after this court decides . . . Munoz.” Justice Evans, and also Justice Goodwin Liu, have dissented in similar cases. (See recently here.)
Dissenting votes: allegedly inadequate sentence reduction
Justices Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Sanchez. Although both the district attorney and the defendant wanted the defendant’s sentence for nine robbery counts reduced from 78-years-to-life to 16 years, which would be about time served, the superior court reduced it to 41-years-to-life. The Second District, Division Five, in an unpublished opinion, affirmed, concluding, “Considering the whole picture, the trial court reasonably rejected the proposal to sentence defendant to, as the court noted, what would amount to about two years for each of the nine robberies—some armed.”
Dissenting vote: involuntary medication
Justice Liu also dissented from the denial of review in People v. Snell. The unpublished, partially redacted opinion of the First District, Division Two, affirmed a superior court order, made without an evidentiary hearing, that authorized the involuntary administration of antipsychotic medication to a defendant who was found mentally incompetent to stand trial on charges of assault with a deadly weapon and assault by means likely to produce great bodily injury.
Justice Liu has dissented from the denials of review at least twice before in similar cases. (See here and here.)
Another conference on, but no decision in, anti-death penalty writ petition
The 19-month-old writ petition that broadly attacks California’s death penalty system as racially discriminatory (Office of the State Public Defender v. Bonta) was on the Supreme Court’s conference list for a seventh time this week (see here). There was no ruling nor any indication what the justices were talking about. The petition is currently waiting for the finality of this month’s opinion in Taking Offense v. State of California (see here).
Juvenile murder resentencing denial grant-and-transfer
The court granted review in People v. Palafox and transferred it back to the Fifth District to reconsider its decision in light of People v. Salazar (2023) 15 Cal.5th 416 (see here) and People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730 (see here). The Fifth District’s unpublished opinion — affirming the denial of a Penal Code section 1170 petition for resentencing of the defendant, who is serving two consecutive life without parole terms for murders committed when he was 16 — didn’t mention either Salazar or Lynch.
Chief Justice Patricia Guerrero did not join her five colleagues in voting to grant.
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were five criminal case grant-and-holds: one waiting for a decision in People v. Morgan (see here), which will be argued next week; two more holding for People v. Allen (see here and here); one more on hold for People v. Espino (see here); and one more waiting for People v. Munoz (see here and People v. Baldwin, above).
