In Conservatorship of E.A., the Supreme Court today holds that a person held in an involuntary conservatorship might be denied her due process rights when there is a delay of a trial about whether she remains gravely disabled. But the constitutional violation can be not prejudicial, as it was in the case before it.
The court’s opinion by Chief Justice Guerrero says “a proposed [Lanterman-Petris-Short Act] conservatee has a due process right to an opportunity to be heard at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner, which necessarily implies a due process right to a timely trial.” Whether a delay violates due process is determined by assessing four factors: “ ‘the length of the pretrial delay, the reason for the delay, the defendant’s assertion of his right, and prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay.’ ”
Although E.A.’s due process right was violated, the opinion also states that “the lengthy pretrial delay” in her case did not require automatic reversal. Rather, the constitutional violation was subject to a prejudicial error analysis and was “harmless beyond a reasonable doubt” because “there is no indication th[e] finding [of grave disability] would have been different if the pretrial delays had not occurred.”
A majority of the court separately concurs. Authored by Justice Liu and signed by Justices Kruger, Groban, and Evans, all of whom sign the court’s opinion, the two-page concurring opinion “emphasize[s] the weighty dignitary interests [involved].” It also says that “a proposed conservatee seeking to enforce her right to a timely trial may secure appropriate relief without demonstrating reversible error in other procedural postures, such as on a petition for writ of mandate after a trial court’s rejection of a speedy trial motion,” because “[g]iving substance to th[e] right [to be heard] is at the heart of what it means for government to respect the inherent dignity of each person.”
The court agreed in part with the unpublished opinion by the First District, Division One, Court of Appeal, disagreeing with Division One’s conclusion that there was no due process violation. But it reversed the Division One judgment affirming a conservatorship order — an affirmance the Supreme Court concluded was correct on harmless error grounds — because the matter was mooted by the later termination of the conservatorship.
