Notable results from the Supreme Court’s conference yesterday:
- The Supreme Court granted Los Angeles District Attorney George Gascón’s petition seeking review of a decision by the Second Appellate District, Division Seven, in Association of Deputy District Attorneys for Los Angeles County v. Gascón. The case involves whether Gascón has the authority to prevent the prosecutors in his office from invoking the Three Strikes law to obtain sentencing enhancements. After Gascón ordered his deputies not to enforce the Three Strikes law, the union representing the deputy district attorneys sued, arguing that Gascón’s policy would force them to violate their obligations to enforce the Three Strikes law. The trial court sided with the union and so did the Court of Appeal, ruling in a published opinion that Gascón does not have discretion to adopt a policy that completely frustrates the purpose and mandate of the Three Strikes law. In granting review, the Supreme Court announced that the Court of Appeal’s opinion will remain citable not only for its persuasive value, “but also for the limited purpose of establishing the existence of a conflict in authority . . . .” In other words, trial courts in future cases can consider this opinion when choosing whether to follow any other conflicting cases already on the books. (See here.)
- The Supreme Court also agreed to answer questions certified by the Ninth Circuit in Huerta v. HSA Electrical Contractors, Inc., a wage & hour case. The court has granted 17 of the last 18 Ninth Circuit requests for help in resolving California law. The questions certified by the Ninth Circuit in this case are:
- Is time spent on an employer’s premises in a personal vehicle and waiting to scan an identification badge, have security guards peer into the vehicle, and then exit a Security Gate compensable as “hours worked” within the meaning of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 16?
- Is time spent on the employer’s premises in a personal vehicle, driving between the Security Gate and the employee parking lots, while subject to certain rules from the employer, compensable as “hours worked” or as “employer-mandated travel” within the meaning of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 16?
- Is time spent on the employer’s premises, when workers are prohibited from leaving but not required to engage in employer-mandated activities, compensable as “hours worked” within the meaning of California Industrial Welfare Commission Wage Order No. 16, or under California Labor Code Section 1194, when that time was designated as an unpaid “meal period” under a qualifying collective bargaining agreement?
[September 6 update:
Thanks to Curt Cutting — writer of Horvitz & Levy’s excellent blog on punitive damages — for reporting on last week’s conference. The only additional items to mention are:
- In the Gascon case (above), Justice Joshua Groban is recused.
- There were 3 criminal case grant-and-holds: one more waiting for the (finality of the) decision in People v. Tran, which filed last week; one on hold for People v. Reynoza (see here); and one more waiting for People v. Lynch (see here).]
