The Supreme Court straight granted one case at its conference yesterday. It was the first straight grant since September 23 after three conferences in a row without one. But the court did continue its streak of not having granted review in a criminal case since July 29.
Speaking of streaks, it was another short-handed conference, with just six justices participating, because Governor Newsom has left unfilled what is now just two days short of a 12–month-long vacancy on the court.
Review granted: conservatorship jury trial waiver
The court agreed to hear Conservatorship of C.O. The First District, Division Four, Court of Appeal, in a partially published opinion, affirmed the imposition of a conservatorship under the Lanterman-Petris-Short Act. C.O. challenged the evidence supporting the conservatorship as well as the conditions that she couldn’t refuse medication and that she be in a locked facility. But what probably prompted review (the court has not limited the issues) is the opinion’s published portion rejecting arguments that the trial court erred by not advising C.O. she had a right to a jury trial and that she did not validly waive the right.
Division Four wrote, “We disagree that LPS proceedings require a proposed conservatee’s personal waiver of the right to a trial by jury, and we find that C.O. knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived her jury trial right through the public defender. We agree that the trial court erred by failing to advise C.O. of her right to a jury trial, but we find the error harmless.”
On the personal waiver issue, the appellate court disagreed with the Second District, Division Six, decision in Conservatorship of Heather W. (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 378 and instead followed the Sixth District’s Conservatorship of C.O. (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 894 decision (not to be confused with the instant C.O. case) and the Fifth District’s opinion in Conservatorship of Mary K. (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 265.
There was no petition for review in Heather W. or Mary K. The Supreme Court denied review in the Sixth District’s C.O. case with Justice Liu recording a dissenting vote. (See here.) Additionally, in April, the court depublished the Second District, Division Four, opinion in Conservatorship of B.K., which, like the First District’s Division Four, had also chosen the Sixth District’s C.O. opinion over Heather W. (See here.)
Ministerial exception grant-and-hold
Behrend v. San Francisco Zen Center is another grant-and-hold for Lorenzo v. San Francisco Zen Center (see here), where the court limited the issue to, “Does the ministerial exception arising under the Religion Clauses of the First Amendment to the United States Constitution categorically preclude wage and hour claims by a minister against a religious organization without any inquiry into whether the claim touches upon any ecclesiastical concern?”
In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the First District, Division Four, agreed with two other First District divisions in Lorenzo and Ehrenkranz (see here) in reversing a defense summary judgment “[b]ecause defendants failed to present evidence that Behrend’s [unpaid wages] claims raised an ecclesiastical concern.”
Racial Justice Act OSC
The court granted the pro per petition for review in In re Jones after the Second District, Division One, had summarily denied a habeas corpus petition, and it sent the case back to Division One with directions to issue an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, concerning a claim under California’s Racial Justice Act (see here, here, and here).
Cause is to be shown “why petitioner is not entitled to the appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e)(5) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of the Racial Justice Act] in light of statistical data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of gang enhancements in Los Angeles County, and to the disclosure of discovery pursuant to Penal Code section 745, subdivision (d) [providing for the disclosure of evidence relevant to a potential violation of the Racial Justice Act in the possession or control of the state].”
The court has made many orders like this before. (See here and, recently, here.)
Racial Justice Act: reciprocal discovery
The court granted review in Wilson v. Superior Court and directed the Fourth District, Division Two, to vacate its summary denial of a writ petition, filed by the State Public Defender’s office, and to require a county district attorney to show cause why relief should not be granted “on the ground that a superior court presented with a standalone postconviction motion for discovery under the California Racial Justice Act of 2020, Penal Code section 745, subdivision (d), lacks jurisdiction to order the defendant to disclose information to the state, absent statutory authorization or the issuance of an order to show cause in a related habeas corpus proceeding.”
The Division Two denial order stated, “The petition fails to demonstrate the trial court abused its discretion in ordering limited reciprocal discovery.”
Dissenting vote: vindictive prosecution
The court denied review in People v. Rollins, but Justice Liu recorded a vote to hear the case. In an unpublished opinion, the First District, Division One, reversed the dismissal of felony charges, a dismissal the superior court based on what it called “implied vindictiveness” following settlement negotiations in a concurrent criminal case against the same defendant.
Division One found the superior court erred because “it effectively employed a presumption of vindictiveness even though no such presumption applied.” The appellate court ordered the felony charges reinstated, rather than remanding for reconsideration under proper legal principles, “because the record is devoid of any direct evidence of actual vindictiveness.”
Pardons recommended
The court granted Governor Newsom’s requests — made last month — for the constitutionally required recommendations that allows him to pardon Tobias Gomez, Jr. and Gary Marshall.
The Governor’s requests stated:
“In 2002 and 2004, Mr. Gomez was convicted of second degree robbery. In 2013, Mr. Gomez was convicted of possession of a controlled substance for sale.”
“In 1972, Mr. Marshall was convicted of second degree burglary. In 1974, Mr. Marshall was convicted of nonsufficient funds.”
Newsom has a nearly perfect clemency record: he withdrew one request before a ruling, but the court — applying a deferential standard (see here and here) — has approved all 117 of his other requests. (Not counting seven requests that are still pending, including four for permission to commute life without parole sentences.) That’s better than former Governor Jerry Brown, who had the court without explanation block 10 intended clemency grants. The denial of a request implies that a clemency grant would be an abuse of power.
Review denied: actionable harm from license plate readers
The court denied review in Mata v. Digital Recognition Network, Inc. The Fourth District, Division One, in a published opinion, held that statutes regulating automated license plate recognition systems give a private right of action only to persons who have suffered “actual harm.”
Division One affirmed a summary judgment for a system operator in a lawsuit brought by a plaintiff “who allege[d] a violation of the ALPR statute but identifie[d] no resulting harm—other than his own subjective belief that his privacy has been invaded by the collection and storage of his data.”
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were four criminal case grant-and-holds: three more waiting for a decision in People v. Eaton (see here), which is scheduled for argument next week; and one more on hold for People v. Dixon (see here).
Grant-and-hold dispositions (see here)
The court dismissed review in Ishal v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board, which had been waiting for the Mayor v. Workers’ Compensation Appeals Board (2026) 20 Cal.5th 874 decision (see here). (Horvitz & Levy filed an amicus brief and presented oral argument in Mayor.)
The court transferred to the Third District People v. Montgomery, which had been on hold for the death penalty opinions in People v. Bankston (see here) and People v. Hin (see here). The transfer order says the Court of Appeal is “to consider whether to vacate its decision and allow supplemental briefing in light of appellant’s ‘Request for Transfer’ . . . . The court expresses no view on whether supplemental briefing should be allowed.”
Finally, review was dismissed in People v. Ramos, which was also a grant-and-hold for Bankston and Hin.
