On Monday morning, the Supreme Court will issue two opinions, including one in which the court has threatened to overrule some of its past precedents.
Coffey v. Shiomoto asks these questions: (1) Can circumstantial evidence other than the results of chemical tests be used to prove that a driver’s blood-alcohol content at the time of driving was the same as, or greater than, the results of a blood-alcohol test taken approximately an hour after driving? (2) Is the decision of the Court of Appeal consistent with the requirements of Evidence Code section 604 for proof of an initially presumed fact after the presumption has been rebutted?
In People v. Diaz, the court will decide: (1) Did the trial court err by failing to instruct the jury sua sponte that it must consider defendant’s extrajudicial, oral statements with caution when the statements constituted the criminal act? (2) If so, did the Court of Appeal correctly conclude that the trial court’s failure to instruct was harmless error?
The Supreme Court has indicated it might use Diaz to overturn prior case law. The court ordered supplemental briefing on these issues: (1) Are there grounds for this court to reconsider precedent holding that a cautionary instruction concerning a defendant’s extra-judicial statements must be given sua sponte, even in the absence of a statute mandating that the instruction be given? (See, e.g., People v. Beagle (1972) 6 Cal.3d 441, 455-456 and fn. 4; People v. Carpenter (1997) 15 Cal.4th 312, 392.) (2) What rationale exists for requiring the cautionary instruction to be given sua sponte, in light of other available instructions, including the general instructions on witness credibility that are routinely given in every case? (See, e.g., CALCRIM No. 226.) (3) If a cautionary instruction is not required sua sponte in every case in which a defendant’s extrajudicial statements tending to prove guilt are admitted, under what circumstances, if any, should it be given upon request? (4) If the rule requiring the court to give the cautionary instruction sua sponte is changed, should the new rule apply retroactively to defendant’s case? (5) What effect, if any, does the Legislature’s adoption of Penal Code section 859.5, subdivision (e)(3), effective January 1, 2014, have on these issues?
Coffey and Diaz were argued on the court’s January calendar. Although Monday is the last regular filing day within the 90-day filing period for January cases, one matter from that calendar will remain undecided. In People v. Scott, the court vacated submission and asked for post-argument briefing. Scott was resubmitted on March 11.
The Coffey and Diaz opinions can be viewed Monday starting at 10:00 a.m.
