Here are a couple of cases with dissenting votes that I couldn’t squeeze into Part I of the recap of Wednesday’s double conference.
Dissenting votes: juvenile offender restitution several liability
The court denied review in In re P.V., but Justice Liu recorded a dissenting vote. A Second District, Division Six, Court of Appeal unpublished opinion rejected an attempt to retroactively apply a statutory change that ended joint and several restitution liability in juvenile delinquency matters (Welf. & Inst. Code, § 730.6(b)(3)). The appellant was adjudged a ward of the court after she and another minor set fire to an elementary school and she was ordered to pay — jointly and severally with the other minor — over $1,000,000 to a school district.
Division Six concluded that, because “direct victim restitution is not a punishment,” an “inference of retroactivity does not apply.”
Section 730.6 has gotten attention at the Supreme Court in the past. Just last month, the court granted review in a case and directed the First District, Division Two, to reconsider a decision that reached the same non-retroactivity result as Division Six in P.V. (See here.) In January, there were two dissenting votes from the denial of review of a 2-1 unpublished opinion holding that, “because the California Constitution expressly provides that crime victims—unlike tort victims—are entitled to reimbursement for their losses,” and “[b]ecause no other co-offenders were adjudicated in this case, [the appellant] is responsible for the full amount of victim restitution.” (See here.)
Dissenting votes: juvenile de facto LWOP resentencing
Justices Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Hernandez. In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth District affirmed the denial of a resentencing petition by a defendants serving a 40 years to life sentence for murder and attempted murder committed when he was a minor.
The defendant sought relief under Penal Code section 1170, which generally permits resentencing of some defendants who were sentenced to life without parole for crimes committed when they were minors, and under the Fourth District, Division One, decision in People v. Heard (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 608, which held that, consistent with equal protection principles, resentencing must also be allowed for those sentenced to the “functional equivalent of life without parole.”
In Hernandez, the Sixth District concluded that the 40 years to life sentence “is not the functional equivalent of life without the possibility of parole.” It reasoned that, because the defendant could be paroled when he’s 58, “he will have the opportunity to rejoin society for a sufficient period to achieve reintegration as a productive and respected member of the community,” and that a release at 58 “also provides an incentive to rehabilitate while in custody and is in line with the penological goals for sentencing those who commit murder and attempted murder.”
The Supreme Court last year granted review in People v. Munoz to decide whether a juvenile homicide offender sentenced to 50 years to life in prison is entitled to recall and resentencing under section 1170(d)(1), on the ground that the sentence is the functional equivalent of life imprisonment without parole. (See here; see also here.)
50 years to life sentences are getting the court’s attention; lesser, but still very lengthy, sentences, not so much. (See here.)
The Hernandez denial of review is “without prejudice to any relief to which defendant might be entitled after this court decides . . . Munoz.” Justices Liu and Evans have dissented in similar cases. (See recently here.)
