Here is part II of the recap of Wednesday’s six-justice Supreme Court conference. Part I is here.
Dissenting vote: PAGA standing; law of the case
Justice Joshua Groban recorded a dissenting vote from the denial of review in Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. v. Superior Court, after a second Fourth District, Division Two, Court of Appeal published opinion allowed a former employee’s action to proceed on claims under the Private Attorneys General Act.
The plaintiff sued for Labor Code violations. Some were individual claims and representative claims under the Private Attorneys General Act, and some were non-PAGA individual claims. After the plaintiff lost an arbitration of only the non-PAGA claims, the superior court confirmed the arbitration award and ruled the award meant she lacked standing to assert the PAGA claims. In its first decision, Division Two affirmed as to the non-PAGA claims, but reversed as to the PAGA claims. (Gavriiloglou v. Prime Healthcare Management, Inc. (2022) 83 Cal.App.5th 595, review denied.)
The employer then tried again to defeat the PAGA claims, asserting Division Two’s first opinion was wrong under the subsequent Supreme Court decision in Adolph v. Uber Technologies, Inc. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 1104 (see here). The superior court, and Division Two’s second opinion, concluded the first opinion was the law of case.
Division Two said, “There is nothing in the PAGA statutes that permits an arbitrator of alleged Labor Code violations to decide the gateway determination of standing to pursue a PAGA claim that was not submitted for arbitration.” It also concluded the Adolph opinion wasn’t an intervening change in the law that called into question the first Division Two decision, which wasn’t even mentioned in Adolph.
Dissenting vote: murder resentencing
The court denied review in People v. Resendez, but Justice Kelli Evans recorded a vote to hear the case. The Second District, Division Four, unpublished opinion affirmed the denial of a resentencing petition under Penal Code section 1172.6, part of Senate Bill 1437, 2018 legislation that limited criminal liability for felony murder and eliminated it for murder under the natural-and-probable-consequences doctrine. The defendant had pled guilty to second degree murder for a fatal shooting committed by his accomplice in a robbery.
The Resendez case has seen lots of appellate action. After an initial denial of resentencing, the Court of Appeal held the superior court shouldn’t have ruled without holding an evidentiary hearing. When the superior court on remand again denied the resentencing petition, Division Four affirmed. The Supreme Court then granted and held and later remanded the case for reconsideration in light of People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867 (see here and here).
The Emanuel court, in a unanimous opinion by Justice Evans, held that statutory changes make it crucial “to distinguish between defendants who participate in a violent felony posing only the foreseeable risk of death inherent in any such crime (who are not liable for deaths that may occur during its commission) from those who knowingly engage in criminal activities known to carry a grave risk of death (who are liable).”
In its third opinion, the subject of the petition for review ruled on this week, Division Four again affirmed, adopting much of its second opinion. The appellate court found “substantial evidence to support the trial court’s finding that [the defendant] acted with reckless indifference to human life.” The defendant in part relied on evidence of his cognitive deficits from being shot in the head years earlier.
Dissenting votes: LWOP affirmance
Justices Goodwin Liu and Evans recorded dissenting votes from the denial of review in People v. Veliz. An unpublished Second District, Division Two, opinion rejected several different arguments in affirming a life without parole sentence for two murders the defendant committed when he was 18.
Division Two found unavailing the defendant’s claims, as stated in the opinion, that “the trial court erred in admitting statements he made to undercover agents during a Perkins operation and in instructing the jury on the failure to explain or deny incriminating evidence [citation omitted][,] [and] that his sentence is cruel and unusual punishment” (footnote omitted).
Perkins operation issues are pending before the court in People v. Allen (see here and here), and LWOP sentences for youthful offenders have been of interest to both Justices Liu and Evans. But, because the dissenting votes aren’t explained, it’s not clear which issue or issues drew their attention. (There’s a fairly simple cure for that: When a message vote’s message is muddled.)
Review denied: Pandemic-era evictions moratorium
The court denied review in Siddell v. City of San Diego. The Fourth District, Division One, in an unpublished opinion, rejected a lawsuit challenging a city ordinance that imposed a temporary moratorium on no-fault residential evictions during the COVID pandemic.
Division One held the plaintiffs had not alleged facts to establish taxpayer standing to bring the action. It also concluded, “City’s decision to implement the eviction moratorium so as to protect the health, safety and welfare of citizens in response to the COVID-19 public health emergency is a matter of discretion that may not be the subject of a section 526a taxpayer action.” Lack of standing aside, Division One additionally found “the ordinance does not effect either a per se or regulatory taking.”
Review denied: Mansion tax
The court also declined to hear Howard Jarvis Taxpayers Association v. City of Los Angeles, a lawsuit challenging Los Angeles City voters’ right to enact via initiative special real property transaction taxes. The tax in question, adopted by almost 58 percent of the voters in 2022 and known as the “Mansion Tax,” funds affordable housing programs and resources for tenants at risk of homelessness through taxes on sales and transfers of real property exceeding $5 million.
In a partially published opinion, the Second District, Division Four, held that, although the California Constitution “restricts a local government’s ability to impose a special transaction tax, it does not limit the ability of voters to do so via initiative.” It also rejected an argument that a section of the Los Angeles City Charter had revoked the voters’ taxing authority.
