Yesterday’s first conference of the 2026-2027 term yielded no straight grants.
It was yet another short-handed conference, with just six justices participating, because Governor Newsom has left unfilled a ten-month-long vacancy on the court, a situation that might continue for a bit longer.
This is Part I of the conference recap. Part II will cover two dissents from review denials and a bunch of grant-and-hold dispositions.
Grant-and-hold: attorney fee reduction
The court granted review and deferred briefing in Taduran v. James R. Glidewell, Dental Ceramics, Inc. The case is on hold pending a decision in Cash v. County of Los Angeles, in which the court granted review to decide these issues, as summarized by court staff — “(1) Did the trial court’s across-the-board reduction of the fees requested by plaintiff’s counsel trigger heightened scrutiny of its fee order on appeal? (2) Did the trial court commit reversible error in reducing the fee request on an across-the-board basis?” (See here.)
In Taduran, the Fourth District, Division Three, Court of Appeal, in a belatedly published opinion in a Labor Code violations case, affirmed the reduction of an attorney fee award to $733,440 from a requested $1,570,500. It said it didn’t need to take sides in a Court of Appeal conflict about whether heightened scrutiny is required for across-the-board cuts, but it did so based on its conclusion that “the trial court . . . provided specific explanations for its choice of a 0.7 multiplier” and it “thus review[ed] that reasoning to determine whether the court’s reduction constituted an abuse of discretion.”
Grant-and-transfer: SVPA
In Harryman v. Superior Court, the court directed the Fourth District, Division Three, to decide on its merits a writ petition the appellate court had summarily denied.
The county public defender’s petition for review states the issues as, “Whether the People may proceed to trial on a petition filed pursuant to Welfare & Institutions Code section 6600, et seq. [the Sexually Violent Predator Act] if no expert finds that the respondent qualifies as a sexually violent predator (‘SVP’)? And whether section 6608 violates equal protection by only permitting committed SVPs to petition for conditional release?” The Attorney General’s answer asserts, “The SVPA grants the People discretion to proceed to trial even if updated evaluations opine that the defendant no longer meets the criteria for an SVP. And nothing in the SVPA requires the People to present expert testimony at trial.” The reply is here.
Another Racial Justice Act OSC
The court granted review and ordered the Second District, Division Two, to issue an order to show cause, returnable in the superior court, in the pro per habeas corpus petition in In re Davis, involving a claim under California’s Racial Justice Act (see here, here, and here). Division Two had summarily denied the habeas corpus petition.
Cause is to be shown “why petitioner is not entitled to the appointment of counsel pursuant to Penal Code section 1473, subdivision (e)(5) [providing for the appointment of counsel for an indigent petitioner who pleads a plausible allegation of a violation of the Racial Justice Act] in light of statistical data provided by petitioner demonstrating racial disparities in the imposition of Three Strikes sentences in Los Angeles County, and to the disclosure of discovery pursuant to Penal Code section 745, subdivision (d) [providing for the disclosure of evidence relevant to a potential violation of the Racial Justice Act in the possession or control of the state].”
The court has made many orders like this before. (See here and, recently, here.)
Racial Justice Act grant-and-transfer
The court in In re Ramirez directed the Second District, Division One, to decide a Racial Justice Act petition itself (as opposed to In re Davis (above), where the appellate court is to send the case to the superior court). Division One had summarily denied the pro per’s writ petition.
The brief pro per petition for review says the issue is, “Is trial court permitted to deny a Penal Code, section 745(d) Motion for Discovery for failure to meet ‘substantial likelihood’ burden that a violation of the statute ‘has occurred’, when the statute only requires a movant to meet the ‘good cause’ burden that a violation of the statute ‘could have occurred’?”
The Attorney General’s answer concedes the superior court used the wrong standard, but argues the “mistaken recitation of the standard . . . is inconsequential in the context of this case because . . . the record clearly demonstrates that petitioner’s motion fails under the correct standard for the same reasons the superior court identified.”
The reply is here.
Criminal case grant-and-holds
There were two criminal case grant-and-holds. Both are additional cases waiting for a decision in People v. Eaton (see here).
