A case on the Supreme Court’s April calendar concerns a restitution award to a crime victim. After the court scheduled oral argument in the case — People v. Ford — the crime victim asked for permission to speak at the argument. The request was made under Marsy’s Law, which, among other things, gives crime victims the right “[t]o be heard, upon request, at any proceeding, including any delinquency proceeding, involving a post-arrest release decision, plea, sentencing, post-conviction release decision, or any proceeding in which a right of the victim is at issue.” (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28(b)(8).)
After requesting and receiving briefing from the parties on the issue, the court decided yesterday that the right to be heard is satisfied, at least in the Supreme Court, by allowing the crime victim to address the court in writing. The court’s order states that the crime victim “may be heard in this court (Cal. Const., art. I, § 28, subd. (b)(8)) by submitting a letter to the Clerk of Court that will be circulated to all the justices. (See Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1247-1249; Today’s Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Office of Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 212-213; accord, Pennsylvania Coal Mining Association v. Insurance Department (Pa. 1977) 370 A.2d 685, 693-694.)”
In the Lewis case cited in the court’s order, the court held that appellate courts are not required to hold an oral argument before issuing a peremptory writ in the first instance. The court there said that the meaning of “hear” and “hearing” “most commonly includes an auditory component, but when used in a legal sense they do not necessarily encompass oral presentations.” (Lewis v. Superior Court (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1232, 1247, fn. omitted.)
Additionally in the Ford case, the court today broadened the issues to be addressed at oral argument. The issue had been solely whether the trial court had jurisdiction to award restitution to the victim although defendant’s probationary term had expired nine days earlier. The court now wants counsel to also discuss: (1) Is the trial court’s order of May 17, 2012, an appealable order? (See Pen. Code, § 1237; cf. Adoption of Michael H. (1995) 10 Cal.4th 1043, 1050.) (2) If not, is the order subject to discretionary writ review? (3) If the order is not appealable but is reviewable by a discretionary writ, may and should this court treat the purported appeal as a writ? (See Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 401.) (4) Should defendant be estopped from challenging the jurisdiction of the trial court to award restitution after his probation had expired?
