The Supreme Court did not accept any cases for briefing, oral argument, and opinion at yesterday’s conference, the third conference in a row without a straight grant. There hasn’t been a straight grant since February 26.
There also weren’t many highlights, but here are some.
Racial Justice Act grant-and-transfer
The court granted a district attorney’s petition for review in People v. Superior Court (Jones) and sent the matter back to the Fourth District, Division Two, Court of Appeal — which had summarily denied the People’s writ petition — for a decision on the merits. From poking around on the internet, it appears the challenge is to a superior court order setting an evidentiary hearing to determine if the prosecutor violated the Racial Justice Act (here and here) by referring to the defendant as a “monster.” It looks like the DA is relying in part on the First District, Division Five, partially published opinion in People v. Quintero (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1060 rejecting arguments “that the prosecution’s use of the race-neutral terms ‘monsters’ and ‘predators’ in closing argument” violated the RJA. The Supreme Court denied review and a depublication request in Quintero last week.
[March 30 update: We’ve now seen the petition for review (which includes a 36-page transcript of superior court proceedings), the answer, and the reply. The People’s petition states the issue presented as, “Whether courts should apply the [People v. Duvall (1995) 9 Cal.4th 464, 474] prima facie standard to all habeas corpus petitions, including those raising claims under the Racial Justice Act.” (Footnotes omitted.)]
Compassionate release OSC
The court issued an order to show cause, returnable before the Fifth District, in In re Brissette, a habeas corpus proceeding. The Supreme Court said the issue is whether Brissette is entitled to relief “on the ground Penal Code section 1172.2 is irreconcilable with Penal Code section 1170.1, subdivision (c).” (Links added.)
A March 7 Fifth District unpublished opinion, in an appeal, affirmed the denial of compassionate release for Brissette despite his having been certified by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation as meeting the criteria for that release under section 1172.2(b)(1) because of his stage IV liver cancer. Bissette is serving an eight-year sentence for possession of a controlled substance by an inmate, a sentence that is consecutive to a sentence for second degree murder. Section 1170.1(c) provides that, when there is a consecutive sentence for an inmate-committed felony, “the term of imprisonment for all the convictions that the person is required to serve consecutively shall commence from the time the person would otherwise have been released from prison.”
Although the Supreme Court’s order requires analysis of the interplay between sections 1172.2 and 1170.1, the Fifth District opinion didn’t rely on, or even mention, section 1170.1 in denying compassionate release. Instead, the appellate court found “Brissette does not meet the clinical criteria of” section 1172.2 and it relied on a superior court “implied finding” that he “posed an unreasonable risk of committing a super strike if released.” Section 1172.2(b) bars an otherwise required compassionate release “if a court finds the defendant is an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
Hospital Lien Act dissenting vote.
The court denied the plaintiff’s petition for review in Yaffee v. Skeen, but Justice Carol Corrigan recorded a vote to grant. The court might have passed up a chance to resolve a conflict in Court of Appeal case law.
The Third District published Yaffee opinion reversed — for a new trial — awards for past and future medical expenses, but affirmed other damages, in a vehicle accident case. It’s likely the dissenting vote concerned the past medical damages issue, about which the appellate court found error “because the trial court improperly interpreted the scope of the Hospital Lien Act.” (Link added.)
The HLA and case law allow a hospital providing emergency services to an injured plaintiff to have a lien on the plaintiff’s recovered damages “to the extent of the amount of the reasonable and necessary charges of the hospital,” even if the “reasonable and necessary” amount exceeds a payment from the plaintiff’s health insurer at a reduced, previously negotiated rate the hospital had agreed to accept as payment in full.
The Yaffee plaintiff recovered the “reasonable and necessary” amount, but the Third District held the superior court applied that HLA measure to too many hospital services. The opinion states “the HLA only applies to services obtained while the patient remains in the emergency room, hospital, or an associated care facility as needed to relieve or eliminate the emergency medical condition,” not to services provided after “the patient is discharged to go home.” It added, “To the extent Newton v. Clemmons (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 1, 10-13 . . . , suggests otherwise, we disagree.”
The Supreme Court denied review in the Fourth District, Division Two, Newton case.
Criminal case grant-and-holds.
There were 10 criminal case grant-and-holds: one more waiting for a decision in People v. Lopez (see here) and the other nine on hold for People v. Rhodius (see here), which will be argued next month.
