The following is our summary of the Supreme Court’s actions on petitions for review in civil cases from the Court’s conference on Wednesday, June 25, 2014. The summary includes those civil cases in which (1) review has been granted, (2) review has been denied but one or more justices has voted for review, or (3) the Court has ordered depublished an opinion of the Court of Appeal.
Review Granted
Property Reserve v. Superior Court (Department of Water Resources), S217738—Review Granted—June 25, 2014
In order to construct a tunnel diverting water from Northern California to Central and Southern California, the State sought to identify land parcels it might acquire to achieve that goal. As part of its environmental investigation of certain parcels, it sought to documenting each parcel’s plant and animal life, and geological activities. This required the State to conducting soil testing and boring activities on the parcels. The State therefore filed petitions to obtain rights of entry to conduct its environmental and geological activities on those parcels.
In a published opinion, Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 828, the Third District Court of Appeal held geological and environmental activities are considered intentional takings, ruling that geological activities are a permanent physical occupation of private property, which is a taking per se under the Constitution. It therefore ruled the statutory pre-condemnation procedure on which the State relied cannot be used to avoid the eminent domain requirements. Justice Cole Blease dissented.
The questions presented are: (1) whether the geological activities constituted a taking under the California Constitution, and if so, (2) whether those activities constituted a direct condemnation requiring the State to pay the landowners under the eminent domain doctrine.
People v. Grewal, S217896—Review Granted—June 25, 2014; People v. Nasser, S217979—Review Granted—June 25, 2014
These cases were consolidated at the trial court level, but addressed separately on appeal. Defendants operated Internet cafes that sold, among other things, prepaid telephone cards. The cards allowed customers to play slot machine games on the cafes’ computers and earn sweepstakes points that could be redeemed for cash. For every 100 points earned, customers could redeem $1. The defendants claimed their sweepstakes program was a legitimate means to promote the sale of their telephone cards, and were not unlawful gambling practices under the Penal Code, which the People claimed them to be.
The trial court granted the People’s motions for preliminary injunctions. The Fifth District Court of Appeal affirmed in a published opinion, People v. Grewal (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 527, and an unpublished opinion, People v. Nasser, 2014 WL 906798. It held the defendants violated the prohibitions against slot machines or gambling devices under Penal Code section 330b, subdivision (d). The question presented is whether the trial court erred in granting a preliminary injunction.
Ybarra v. Apartment Investment and Management Company, S217994—Review Granted and Held—June 25, 2014
When defendant Aimco hired the plaintiff as a manager for one of its apartment communities, the parties signed an arbitration agreement prohibiting class and representative actions. When the plaintiff filed a complaint against Aimco for violations of the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA) (Lab. Code, § 2698 et seq.), Aimco moved to compel arbitration to terminate the representative claim. The trial court denied the motion, ruling the arbitration agreement was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable. The Court of Appeal, Second District, Division Two, reversed in an unpublished opinion, holding the waiver was valid and enforceable because it furthered the purpose of the Federal Arbitration Act, which requires that arbitration agreements be enforced according to their terms.
The Supreme Court granted and held, ordering briefing deferred “pending consideration and disposition of a related issue in Iskanian v. CLS Transportation of Los Angeles, S204032 (see Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.512(d)(2)), or pending further order of the court.” This grant-and-hold order is a bit unusual since the Court decided Iskanian on June 23, two days before issuing the grant-and-hold. But perhaps the Court has simply placed Ybarra on hold while it decides whether further briefing is required in light of its holding in Iskanian.
Cheroti v. Harvey & Madding, S218724—Review Granted and Held—June 25, 2014
The question presented is whether the trial court erred in denying the defendant’s petition to compel arbitration on grounds of unconscionability. The Court of Appeal, First District, Division One, held in an unpublished decision that the arbitration agreement at issue was not substantively unconscionable and procedurally unconscionable only in a trivial sense. The court therefore reversed the trial court’s denial of the petition to compel arbitration and enforce the arbitration agreement.
The Supreme Court granted review and ordered briefing deferred “pending decision in Sanchez v. Valencia Holding Co. LLC, S199119, which includes the following issue: Does the Federal Arbitration Act (9 U.S.C. § 2), as interpreted in AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion (2011) 563 U. S. __ [131 S.Ct. 1740], preempt state law rules invalidating mandatory arbitration provisions in a consumer contract as procedurally and substantively unconscionable?”
City of San Jose v. Superior Court (Smith), S218066—Review Granted—June 25, 2014
The plaintiff submitted a request to the City seeking specific public records, including conversations between public officials on their private cell phones or email accounts. The City denied the request to access the private communications on the ground they are not included in the definition of “public records” under the California Public Records Act (CPRA) (Gov. Code, § 6250 et seq.). The plaintiff brought an action for declaratory relief seeking disclosure of the disputed records.
The trial court granted declaratory relief, concluding the CPRA does not exclude individual officials from the definition of a “public agency,” since agencies may only act through their officers and employees. The Sixth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding the CPRA does not require public access to communications between public officials who exclusively used their private cell phones or email accounts.
The question presented is: “Are written communications pertaining to city business, including email and text messages, which (a) are sent or received by public officials and employees on their private electronic devices using their private accounts, (b) are not stored on city servers, and (c) are not directly accessible by the city, ‘public records’ within the meaning of the California Public Records Act?”
Review Denied (with dissenting justices)
None.
Depublished
None.
